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THE WISCONSIN DRUG TAX STAMP LAW, THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT, AND THE REALITIES OF
TAXING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989 the Wisconsin Legislature passed Subchapter IV of
Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 139 ("Subchapter IV"), thereby bringing
Wisconsin in line with about one dozen other states that had passed
taxes on controlled substances In general, the ten statutory sections
that comprise this subchapter establish a system of taxation and
punishment under which individuals are required to purchase tax stamps
in proportion to the amount of controlled substances in their possession
and to affix and display these stamps on the levied drugs.2
It is the purpose of this Comment to address the validity of this
statutory scheme in light of three identifiable purposes it could be meant
to serve. First, this statutory scheme has been identified as a potential
means of identifying drug dealers and to thus serve as a law enforcement
tool in the war on drugs. However, this purpose, identified by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Haff as the true motivation of the
Wisconsin Legislature, cannot be served under a statute that complies
with the constitutional protection against state compelled self-
incrimination. After the court struck down the statutory scheme in Hall,
the legislature had to amend the statutes to try and serve the needs of
another purpose which the law was never intended to serve. The second
purpose this statute could conceivably serve is to raise revenue. The
evidence and realities of such a law reveal that the revenue raised under
such a statute is negligible and that there was an understanding of this
on the part of the State in creating Subchapter IV. Finally, the statutory
scheme can be justified in that it serves the purpose of providing another
means of punishing drug offenders. This goal is served somewhat under
the revised law, but as an analysis of various charging situations will
1. The following states had laws establishing taxes on controlled substances that were
passed in or prior to 1989: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Montana,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah. See Frank A. Racaniello,
Note, State Drug Taxes: A Tax We Can't Afford, 23 RUTGERS LJ. 657, 662-63 & nn.35-54
(1992).
2. See WIs. STAT. §§ 139.87-.96 (1997).
3. 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997).
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show, the statute cannot invariably be used as a means of further
punishing drug offenders. Both the federal and state constitutions'
double jeopardy provisions and the line of both state and federal cases
that have interpreted these provisions stand as a barrier in many
situations to charging a defendant under both the state's controlled
substances laws and the drug tax stamp law.
Part II of this Comment will explain the Wisconsin statutory scheme.
Part III will look at the failed attempt by the Wisconsin Legislature to
use the drug tax stamp as a law enforcement tool to identify drug
dealers. This discussion focuses on the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decision in State v. Hall, in which the statutory scheme as originally
enacted was struck down for violating the privilege against self-
incrimination. Also addressed are the 1997 amendments to the
statutory scheme and whether they correct the constitutional
deficiencies identified in Hall. Part IV is a brief look at the realities
behind the use of a tax on controlled substances as a legitimate revenue-
raising device. Finally, Part V will look to the double jeopardy
protections of the state and federal constitutions as a potential barrier to
the use of the drug tax stamp laws as a punitive measure against drug
dealers. The double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments
may, under Wisconsin law, prevent common charging situations in
which both the criminal penalties of the tax stamp law and a substantive
drug crime are charged.
II. THE WISCONSIN STATUTORY SCHEME4
The statutory provisions of Subchapter IV apply to any person who
qualifies as a "dealer," as defined under Wisconsin Statutes section
139.87.' A dealer is any person, who in violation of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act (Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 961),6
"possesses, manufactures, produces, ships, transports, delivers,
distributes, imports, sells or transfers to another person" a quantity of
drugs in excess of certain statutory limits.7 Such persons are required
4. This introduction to Subchapter IV discusses the statutes as they existed before 1997
and the decision in State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997). For an explanation of how the
statutory scheme has been altered to comply with the decision in Hall, see infra Part III.B.
5. See WIS. STAT. § 139.88 (1995). Section 139.88 states in pertinent part: "There is
imposed on dealers, upon acquisition or possession in this state, an occupational tax .... I" d.
6. Previously, including at the time of the pertinent decisions discussed in this Comment,
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, as adopted in Wisconsin, was codified in Wisconsin
Statutes Chapter 161.
7. Wis. STAT. § 139.87(2) (1995). The statutory definition reads as follows:
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under the law to purchase from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue
(DOR), either by mail or in person, tax stamps in proportion to the
weight or quantity, depending on the nature of the substance, of the
drugs possessed! The tax stamp provision applies to any Schedule I or
I9 controlled substance under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.10
"Dealer" means a person who in violation of ch. 961 possesses, manufactures,
produces, ships, transports, delivers, distributes, imports, sells or transfers to another
person more than 42.5 grams of material containing tetrahydrocannabinols, more
than 5 plants containing tetrahydrocannabinols, more than 14 grams of mushrooms
containing psilocin or psilocybin, more than 100 milligrams of any material
containing lysergic acid diethylamide or more than 7 grams of any other schedule I
or schedule H controlled substance or of a controlled substance analog of a schedule
I or schedule II controlled substance. "Dealer" does not include a person who
lawfully possesses a controlled substance or controlled substance analog.
Id.
& See WIS. STAT. § 139.88-.89 (1995); State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778,785 (Wis. 1997).
9. Schedule I substances are those with a "high potential for abuse," that have "no
currently accepted medical use" and "[l]ackfl accepted safety for use in treatment under
medical supervision." WIS. STAT. § 961.13(lm) (1995). They include opiates such as heroin
and morphine, synthetic opiates and hallucinogens such as MDMA and PCP. See WIs. STAT.
§ 961.14 (1995). Schedule II substances are those with a "high potential for abuse," but have
a "currently accepted medical use." WIS. STAT. §H 961.15(lm)(a), (b) (1995). Also, the abuse
of such substances "may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence." WIS. STAT. §
961.14(lm)(c) (1995). They include opium, cocaine and its derivatives, amphetamines, and
methamphetamines. See WIS. STAT. § 961.16 (1995).
10. See WIs. STAT. § 139.87(2) (1995). Section 139.88 provides for taxation at the
following rates:
(1) Per gram or part of a gram of material containing tetrahydrocannabinols,
whether pure or impure, measured when in the dealer's possession, $3.50.
(1d) Per plant containing tetrahydrocannabinols, regardless of weight, counted when
in the dealer's possession, $1,000.
(1g) Per gram or part of a gram of mushrooms or parts of mushrooms containing
psilocin or psilocybin, whether pure or impure, measured when in the dealer's
possession, $10.
(r) Per 100 milligrams or part of 100 milligrams of any material containing lysergic
acid diethylamide, whether pure or impure, measured when in the dealer's
possession, $100.
(2) Per gram or part of a gram of other schedule I controlled substances or schedule
II controlled substances, whether pure or impure, measured when in the dealer's
possession, $200.
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The failure to obtain the tax stamps carries several possible
consequences. First, there is the civil penalty of collection of the tax and
a 100% penalty collected by the DOR." Second, the legislature made
the possession of controlled substances without tax stamps affixed a
felony, punishable up to five years in prison and/or a maximum fine of
$10,000.12
Prior to 1997 and the decision in State v. Hall,'3 the statute contained
certain safeguards that were meant to protect the confidentiality of the
dealer purchasing the stamps. The statute specifically provides no
immunity from criminal prosecution to the dealer,14 but the legislature
did recognize potential constitutional challenges on self-incrimination
grounds when it wrote the confidentiality provisions of section 139.91."
Under the pre-1997 version of this statute, there were three major
protections. First, the DOR could not "reveal facts obtained in
administering [the drug tax stamp law]," except in publishing "statistics
that do not reveal the identities of dealers."16 Second, dealers were not
"required to provide any identifying information in connection with the
purchase of the stamps. 1 7  Both of those confidentiality-protecting
provisions remain a part of the new statutory scheme. 8 Third, the law
provided that "[n]o information obtained" through administration of the
drug tax stamp law could
be used against a dealer in any criminal proceeding unless that
WIS. STAT. § 139.88 (1995).
11. See WIs. STAT. §139.95(1) (1995). For a case holding that the imposition of the tax
and penalty under a statutory scheme much like Wisconsin's is so punitive as to be criminal,
thereby implicating double jeopardy protections pursuant to Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994), see Lynn v. West, 134 F.3d 582 (1998).
12 See Wis. STAT. § 139.95(2) (1995). Under recent amendments to the law, the
possible sentence for possession of untaxed drugs was raised to seven years and six months on
December 31, 1999. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 139.95(2) (West Supp. 1999); 1997 WIS. ACr 283,
§ 106.
13. 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997).
14. See WIs. STAT. § 139.90 (1995).
15. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 791 (quoting Memorandum from Eng Braun, Wisconsin
Department of Revenue, to Jack Stark, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (June 17,
1987) (also reproduced in Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at App. 38-40, State v.
Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR) ("The difficulty in maintaining
confidentiality could result in dealers claiming that the requirement to pay the controlled
substances tax violates their constitutional right against self-incrimination.")).
16. WIs. STAT. § 139.91 (1995).
17. Id.
18. See WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.91(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1999).
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information [had] been independently obtained, except in
connection with a proceeding involving possession of schedule I
controlled substances or schedule II controlled substances on
which the tax [had] not been paid or in connection with taxes due
under [the drug tax stamp law] from the dealer.'9
In effect, the third of these provisions, which was substantially less
protective than those found in states applying similar schemes,"° allowed
for the use of information conveyed by a taxpayer in a criminal
proceeding against the taxpayer in three situations. First, it allowed for
the use of "independently obtained" information, that is, information
not obtained by the DOR.2' Second, it allowed the prosecution to use
information obtained by the DOR in a criminal prosecution involving
untaxed drugs.2 Finally, the confidentiality provision also provided an
exception for use in the case against the dealer on the basis that the tax
is owed.z' For example, if there were evidence that there were X pounds
of a controlled substance in the possession of the dealer, for which taxes
were only paid for Y pounds (a lesser amount), the amount of tax
actually paid may be used as evidence in the case against the dealer.
Indeed, the amount of tax paid is necessary evidence to the
establishment of tax liability in such a case. 4
III. THE DELEGIIMIZATION OF THE DRUG TAx STAMP LAW AS A
LAW ENFORCEMENT TOOL
A. State v. Hall
Prior to 1997, the Wisconsin appellate courts had twice been
confronted with constitutional challenges to charges brought against a
19. WIS. STAT. § 139.91 (1995).
20. See, eg., MINN. STAT. § 297D.13 (1995).
21. See WIs. STAT. § 139.91 (1995).
22. See icL
23. See iL
24. Other pertinent provisions of Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 139, Subchapter IV are a
section providing for "[e]xamination of records," WIS. STAT. § 139.92 (1995), a section
establishing procedure for "[a]ppeals, presumptions, [and] administration," WIs. STAT. §
139.93 (1995), a section providing for refunds of tax paid in the case of erroneous levies, see
WIs. STAT. § 139.94 (1995), and a section providing for the appropriate "[u]se of revenue,"
WIs. STAT. § 139.96 (1995). The last of these statutory provisions, namely the "use of
revenue" statute, was altered slightly by the post-Hall amendments. See infra notes 132-34
and accompanying text.
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defendant under section 139.95. In State v. Heredia,' the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statutory scheme,
particularly the confidentiality provisions of section 139.91, after a facial
challenge against the law was brought on various constitutional
grounds.' In State v. Dowe the court of appeals rejected an individual
challenge based on double jeopardy grounds.' The defendant argued
unsuccessfully that possession with intent to deliver under Wisconsin
Statutes section 961.41 (formerly section 161.41) was a lesser included
crime of being a dealer in violation of section 139.95, and therefore the
charging of both was in violation of the double jeopardy protection
against multiple punishments of both the United States and Wisconsin
constitutions."
It was against this background that State v. Halr reached the court
of appeals.31 The appellant/defendant, Darryl J. Hall, was convicted on
25. 493 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
26. The defendant in Heredia attacked the constitutionality of Subchapter IV on three
grounds. See id. at 406. First he alleged that the statute violates the privilege against self-
incrimination by requiring the taxpayer to convey information that would "increase the
likelihood of conviction for possession." Id. at 407. The court of appeals found that, because
"section 139.91 specifically provides that '[d]ealers may not be required to provide any
identifying information,"' the statute "both contemplates and permits the anonymous
payment of the tax." Id. Thus, any identifying information received by the DOR would not
be compelled at all, but rather would be voluntarily conveyed. See id. Heredia also argued
that Subchapter IV was violative of due process because it was "not a true tax, but merely an
alternative method of suppressing crime." Id. at 408. The court found that even if Heredia's
arguments were true, due process is not violated so long as the defendant has the right to a
hearing before a penalty is imposed, as is provided under Subchapter IV. See id. Heredia
also argued that Subchapter IV is void for vagueness. See id. at 408. He cited various
ambiguities in the statutory scheme, such as whether the weights under the definition
"include-] potential contaminants or cutting agents," whether the tax can be applied to those
who had the requisite weight of controlled substances in their possession at one time, but no
longer do, how the tax stamp is to be affixed, especially given the reality that a dealer will
break up the requisite weight of drugs into a smaller quantity for sale, and "whether 'the
failure to pay the tax [is] a continuing crime or a separate offense for each day, week or
month that the tax is not paid."' Id. at 409. The court dismissed these potential ambiguities
out of hand, as they did not implicate First Amendment values. See id.
27. 541 N.W.2d 218 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 557 N.W.2d 812 (Wis.
1997). The case was overturned on appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court because of the
decision in State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997), which found Subchapter IV to be
unconstitutional. See State v. Dowe, 557 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Wis. 1997). Therefore, the
supreme court did not reach the double jeopardy issue addressed by the court of appeals. See
id.
28. See Dowe, 541 N.W.2d at 219.
29. See id. at 219-20. See infra Part V.B.2 for a discussion of the court's decision.
30. 540 N.W.2d 219 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997).
31. It should be noted that Heredia, Dowe, and Hall were all convicted before certain
amendments to sections 139.87 and 139.88 went into effect. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.87-
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four counts: two consecutive thirty-year sentences for delivery of
cocaine base in violation of Wisconsin Statutes sections 161.41(1)(cm)4,
161.48, and 161.49 to be served concurrently with two consecutive three
year sentences for violation of section 139.95, the penalty provision of
Subchapter IV.' Hall brought both a facial challenge to the drug tax
stamp scheme on self-incrimination grounds and a non-facial,
individualized challenge based on the fact that that conviction for both
the possession charge and the tax stamp violation offends the double
jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.3
The court of appeals rejected both of the defendant's arguments The
court of appeals did concede that the affix and display provisions of the
statute were violative of the privilege against self-incrimination, but it
applied a "saving construction" to the statute, thus remedying the
constitutional deficiencies." The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted
review of the decision and handed down its opinion in January 1997,
striking down the law as unconstitutional on the grounds that it
infringed upon both the federal and state constitutional provisions
against state compelled self-incrimination.' The court did not reach
Hall's double jeopardy argument.'
Justice William A. Bablitch, writing for the court, identified three
issues presented by the case. The first was whether Wisconsin Statute
section 139.89 compels self-incrimination contrary to Article I, section
8(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution." The scope of the privilege was defined by
.88 (West Supp. 1998); 1995 Wis. Act 448 §§ 95-99, 100-101. Therefore the definition of
dealer as it appears at supra note 7 and the section defining the tax rates, supra at note 10
were slightly different. However, none of these changes would have affected the outcome of
any of the three defendants' cases.
32. See Hal4 557 N.W.2d at 782-83.
33. See id. at 783 & n.2. See infra Part V.B.3 for a discussion of the court of appeals
decision concerning the double jeopardy challenge.
34. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 783; Hall, 540 N.W.2d at 223.
35. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 783; Hall, 540 N.W.2d at 226-27. See infra for explanation of
this "saving construction.
36. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 783.
37. See id. at 783 n.2; Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 58-76, State v. Hall, 557
N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
38. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d. at 783. The Wisconsin constitutional provision embodying the
privilege against self-incrimination states that no person "may be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself or herself." WIS. CONsT. art. I., § 8(1). The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part: "No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONsT. amend V. The
law regarding the self-incrimination provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution "parallel[s]
federal analysis." State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77, 90 (Wis. 1988).
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the court as extending to any situation in which "a person has a real and
appreciable apprehension that information compelled by the state could
be used against him or her in a criminal proceeding.,
39
Pertinent to this case is the two-tiered protection the privilege
provides. It protects both "direct" and "derivative" use of compelled
information.' The protection against direct use protects against "use of
information which would support a conviction.", An example of this
would be the use by the prosecution of a compelled confession to a
crime. The protection against derivative use protects against the use of
"compelled information to furnish a link in the chain of evidence
necessary for prosecution. '  Hall argued that the Wisconsin statutory
scheme compelled him to convey information that could be used
derivatively against him in a prosecution for a violation of the Wisconsin
drug laws.43 The scheme, Hall argued, was constitutionally defective
because the actual act of purchasing the drugs conveyed information
usable by law enforcement to identify the tax purchaser as being in the
possession of narcotics.4' Furthermore, because of a loophole in the
confidentiality provision of the statute, adhering to the "affix and
display" provision of the Subchapter IV would convey "vital evidence"
to the state in a prosecution for drugs for which no tax was paid.4'5 The
act of affixing and displaying the stamps showed that the possessor of
some drugs, for which taxes were paid, had both the requisite
knowledge that other unstamped drugs were controlled substances and
the statutory intent to possess controlled substances.4'
In addressing whether the information was actually compelled by the
statutory scheme, the court applied the test established by the United
States Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States.47 The Marchetti
39. Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 783.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 783.
42. Id. The information compelled will fall within the ambit of this protection if it
merely furnishes an "investigative lead." See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460
(1972); Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 8, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis.
1997) (No. 94-2848-CR) (citing Kastigar).
43. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 784.
44. See id. The court of appeals rejected this claim relying on the decision in State v.
Heredia, 493 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). See State v. Hall, 540 N.W. 2d 219, 225 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997).
45. Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 784-85.
46. See id. at 785.
47. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti, the Court determined that given the reporting
requirements of an excise tax on illegal gambling and an occupational tax on bookmakers, a
[Vol. 83:659
WISCONSIN DRUG TAX STAMP LAW
Court laid out a three prong analysis for the determination of whether
the Fifth Amendment was violated by a tax scheme.4' If all of the
following factors are satisfied, the tax violates the privilege against self-
incrimination. First, the tax must concern "an area 'permeated with
criminal statutes"' and be "aimed at individuals 'inherently suspect of
criminal activities."' 49  Second, the taxpayer must be required to
"provide information which a person might reasonably suppose would
be available to prosecuting authorities."'  Finally, the information
provided must be of the kind that would "provide a significant link in a
chain of evidence tending to establish guilt."'"
The first prong of the Marchetti test was easily satisfied given that
the subject of the tax is controlled substances and the taxpayers are
"dealers," who by statutory definition are in possession of the drugs in
contravention of the law.u When approaching its analysis under the
second prong of Marchetti, the court conducted two separate analyses.
The first focused on Hall's attack on the purchase requirements of the
statute 3 The court then addressed the attack on the affix and display
requirements of the statute.
The court first addressed whether the terms of the statutory scheme
require, through the act of purchasing the stamps, the taxpayer to
convey information that would be available to prosecuting authorities.
The court acknowledged that any information conveyed through the act
of purchasing the stamps is incriminating, because it serves as an
admission of possession of drugs and provides evidence to establish
knowledge of possession.55 However, this fact is irrelevant under
defendant who asserts the privilege against self-incrimination could "not be criminally
punished for failure to comply with [the] requirements." Id. at 42, 61.
4& See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 784. The Marchetti test has been applied in many state cases
involving statutory provisions which tax illegal narcotics, some of which are substantially
similar to the present-day Wisconsin statutory scheme. See, e.g., Briney v. State Dep't of
Revenue, 594 So.2d 120 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 660
N.E.2d 310 (Ind. 1995); State v. Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1992); Sisson v. Triplett,
428 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1988); State v. Garza, 496 N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1993).
49. Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 784 (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47).
50. Id
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 786.
55. See id. at 785. The State had argued that the purchase of stamps was not necessarily
incriminating because "not all stamp purchasers are drug dealers. Anyone with the money
and the inclination can buy the stamps. And experience in some states shows that most of the
stamps are sold to collectors or bought as gag gifts." Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 6, State
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Marchetti if there is no reasonable ground to believe that the
information would be revealed to prosecuting authorities. Given the
confidentiality provisions of the statute, combined with the Wisconsin
DOR's mail order procedure for the tax stamps, the court was satisfied
that a taxpayer may purchase stamps with the assurance that the act of
purchasing will not reveal information to prosecuting authorities.m
Under the DOR procedures there were two means by which a taxpayer
could pay the tax. 7 A dealer could purchase the stamps in person at the
offices of the DOR in Madison.' Alternatively, a taxpayer could avoid
the "serious risk" of being observed by law enforcement while going
into the DOR offices59 by using the DOR's mail order payment
procedure.'O If purchased through the mail, any self-identifying
information (a name or pseudonym and address or post office box)
communicated to the DOR, would be protected from disclosure by the
confidentiality provisions of the statute.6 Thus, Hall's challenge to the
purchase requirements of the statute failed because the mail order
option, created not by the statute itself, but by the DOR as an
administrative procedure, provided sufficient protection from self-
incrimination to pass the second prong of Marchetti. Because Hall could
not satisfy this prong of the Marchetti analysis, the court's inquiry
concerning the purchase requirements was at an end.
Although the purchase requirement of the statute was not
constitutionally defective under prong two of Marchetti, the Hall court
found that given the loopholes in the confidentiality provision of section
139.91, the affix and display requirement would allow a dealer to
reasonably suppose that compelled incriminating information would be
available to prosecuting authorities. 2 Affixing and displaying the
stamps was an act of self-incrimination because "[p]ossession of the
v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR) (citing Racaniello, supra note 1, at
665).
56. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 786.
57. See id. at 785.
58. See L Through a prohibition on the transfer of stamps, the statutes require that it
must be the dealer who purchases the stamps. See WIS. STAT. § 139.89 (1995) ("No person
may transfer to another person a stamp or other evidence of payment.").
59. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 786. Information of the kind obtained through independent
police surveillance of the Department of Revenue office would be considered information
"independently obtained" and therefore not covered by the confidentiality statute. See idU at
785-86; Wis. STAT. § 139.91 (1995).
60. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 785-86.
61. See id. at 786.
62. See id. at 787.
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stamp signifies the possessor's knowledge of the nature of the substance
he or she possesses - an element of a drug possession charge." 61 The
confidentiality provisions provided no protection against use of the
presence of stamps as evidence against the dealer in a criminal
prosecution for violation of the state's drug laws, if such evidence was
obtained by a law enforcement agency independent of the DOR.6
Thus, although the DOR could not reveal information to a local
prosecutor's office regarding the payment of tax, police who discover
the stamped drugs could use the presence of the stamps because it is
information "independently obtained." Given this potential use of
compelled information by the state, the court found that Hall's
challenge to the affix and display provisions of the statute satisfied the
second prong of Marchetti."
The Hall court concluded its Marchetti analysis by finding that
information compelled by compliance with Subchapter IV would
"provide a significant link in a chain of evidence tending to establish
guilt." 67  Here, however, rather than focusing on information
independently obtained to prove knowledge of the nature of the
controlled substance as it did under prong two analysis, the court relied
on two different grounds for finding that Hall satisfied prong three.
First, it relied on the determination of the court of appeals that
information "obtained by the DOR" could be used in a derivative
fashion.63 Second, the court found that the "stamp law allows the State
to use compelled information as an investigative lead to information
used against dealers in a criminal proceeding."69 Why the court focused
on these two grounds rather than the grounds it relied upon in its prong
63. Id at 786.
64. See id. at 786-87.
65. See id The court found that this information "independently obtained" could be
used to prove knowledge of the nature of drugs for which taxes have been paid and those for
which taxes have not been paid. See id. at 787.
66. See id at 787.
67. Id
68. See id In fact, the court of appeals did not address the use of compelled information
that was "obtained by the DOR" as suggested by the supreme court. See State v. Hall, 540
N.W.2d 219, 226 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997). Rather, the sole
focus of the determination of the court of appeals that the affix and display provision would
violate the defendant's right against self incrimination is the use of independently obtained
information, namely the use of the presence "of the tax stamps to prove a taxpayer's
knowledge of the nature of the controlled substance." Id.
69. Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 787. The court did not explain which information and from what
source it was referring to in establishing the investigative lead grounds for satisfying prong
three of Marchetti.
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two analysis is unclear, but use by law enforcement of the presence of
stamps to infer knowledge would have equally satisfied the prong three
"substantial link" requirement."
Although Hall's attack on the affix and display provisions satisfied
all three prongs of Marchetti, this did not end the court's analysis.7
Rather, the second question the court needed to address was whether
the confidentiality provisions of Subchapter IV satisfied the standards
established in Kastigar v. United States.7 In Kastigar, the United States
Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination may be
protected despite a compulsion to give self-incriminating evidence if
there is some other protection as broad at the self-incrimination
privilege. The State of Wisconsin alleged that section 139.91, the
confidentiality provision, provides protection "coextensive" with the
privilege. Reiterating that the privilege against self-incrimination
provides protection for both direct and derivative use and because the
confidentiality provisions do not provide protection from derivative use,
the court found the protection was not coextensive.75 The sole focus was
on the use of information obtained by the DOR and not on the use of
information independently obtained by law enforcement through the
presence of affixed stamps. The court's primary concern was with the
fact that the state could use information obtained by the DOR in
"situations in which taxes are not at issue."76 This was allowed under the
clause of the confidentiality provision allowing "information obtained
70. It appears that there were four sources of unconstitutionally compelled information
that the court could have relied upon in its analysis of Marchetti prong two and three for the
affix and display requirement: (1) use of independently obtained information of presence of
stamps to prove knowledge of the nature of controlled substances for which taxes were paid;
(2) use of independently obtained information of presence of stamps to prove knowledge of
the nature of controlled substances for which taxes were not paid; (3) use of information
obtained by the DOR to prove knowledge of controlled substances for which taxes were not
paid, see infra note 77 and accompanying text; and (4) "investigative lead" grounds asserted
under the prong three analysis.
71. See iL at 787.
72. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
73. See id at 453; Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 787.
74. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 787.
75. See id. at 787-89. The court's inquiry into whether the confidentiality provisions
were coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination is duplicative of its earlier
analysis under Marchetti. This is because the court took section 139.91 into account in
conducting its Marchetti analysis. Before reaching its conclusion under the Kastigar
coextensive protection analysis, the court had already concluded that even in light of the
confidentiality provisions there were ways in which the state could derivatively use compelled
information against the defendant.
76. Id. at 788.
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by the DOR to be used [against a dealer in a criminal] proceeding
involving possession of... controlled substances on which the tax has
not been paid."' Also problematic was the fact that the confidentiality
provision was not enforceable, because there was no provision that
penalized a DOR employee for breaching the confidentiality provision.78
The third and final issue the Hall court addressed was whether the
court of appeals' "saving construction" was applicable to the statutory
scheme.79 The court of appeals, having recognized some of the same
constitutional defects as the supreme court, held that it would
construe the drug tax stamp statute to preserve its
constitutionality by interpreting [the confidentiality provision] to
preclude the State from using any information gained as a result
of a tax stamp purchaser's compliance with the statute, including
the presence of affixed tax stamps, as evidence in a subsequent
drug prosecution.'
It reached this conclusion by stating that the purpose of the statute
was not to provide information to the State to be used in a criminal
prosecution, and therefore, a construction of the statute prohibiting such
use of information did not conflict with the legislative intent."
However, the supreme court felt that by construing the statute in
such a manner, it would be "rewriting the statute" in a fashion contrary
77. Id; WIs. STAT. § 139.91 (1995). The court gave the following hypothetical example
of how this clause would allow use of compelled information against the defendant:
[I]n a prosecution for possession with intent to deliver cocaine for which no tax has
been paid, any information learned from a defendant who had paid the tax on other,
stamped, cocaine could be used against him or her as long as he or she had paid no
tax on the cocaine directly involved in the possession charge. For example, if a
dealer possesses 25 grams of cocaine, but buys tax stamps for only 15 grams, the
statute does not bar the DOR clerk from identifying the dealer as having admitted,
by application for the stamps, to possession of 15 grams of cocaine, and thus
knowledge and intent that the unstamped 10 grams are illegal cocaine and the dealer
intended to possess them.
Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 78&
78. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 78&
79. See id. at 789.
80. State v. Hall, 540 N.W.2d 219,227 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis.
1997) (emphasis in original).
81. See id.
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to legislative intent.' The court flatly disagreed with the court of
appeals on the issue of legislative intent, finding that the "[l]egislative
history reveals that the legislature's purpose for drafting the original
drug stamp tax bill was to learn the identity of drug dealers."8' The
legislature was aware of the potential problems of self-incrimination and
was fully capable of drafting a statute that would comply with the
constitution by providing a protection coextensive with the privilege
against self-incrimination, yet chose to write section 139.91 with
loopholes allowing Subchapter IV to be used as a law enforcement
tool. ' In reaching this conclusion, the Hall court was particularly
persuaded by assertions of state legislators that the tax scheme was
created "to get at the dealers" and that it was created with not even a
minimal expectation of raising revenue.'
In illustrating that the legislature knew how to draft a statute that
would withstand constitutional scrutiny, but opted not to, the court in
effect suggested to the legislature ways to remedy the statute. The court
cited two statutory provisions that the legislature could have used as
models, but chose not to.s The first was the confidentiality provision of
the Minnesota drug tax stamp law which the court suggested would pass
constitutional muster, as it prohibited the derivative use of information
obtained by the department and the use of that compelled through the
affix and display provisions that was allowed under section 139.91.8 The
Minnesota statute appears in the drafting record of Subchapter IV, and
the court concluded that the deviation from the language of the
Minnesota provision provided further evidence of a legislative intent to
use Subchapter IV to identify drug dealers.5 The other statutory
provision the court found relevant was a provision of the same act that
contained Subchapter IV, which provided both direct and derivative
protection in the context of immunized testimony.' Having found the
use of a saving construction to be inapplicable, the court held that the
82. See State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778,789 (Wis. 1997).
83. Id. at 790.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 790-91.
86. See id. at 791.
87. See id. The Minnesota confidentiality provision provides, in pertinent part, that
"[no] information contained in such a report or return or obtained from a dealer be used
against the dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless independently obtained, except in
connection with a proceeding involving taxes due under this chapter from the dealer making
the return." Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 297D).
88. See id.
89. See id. The statute at issue was section 972.085 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
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entirety of Subchapter IV was unconstitutional.'
B. The Legislative and Judicial Response to State v. Hall
Following the striking down of Subchapter IV in Hall, the state
legislature was left with the task of trying to revamp the statutory
provisions in a manner that would provide the constitutional protections
found lacking in Hall. The decision in Hall came down in January 1997,
and by April the leadership of the State Assembly,9' as well as the
Department of Justice,' the DOR,? and the Governor's Office' were
pursuing ways to revitalize Subchapter IV. At this point it was clear that
the shortcomings identified in Hall would be addressed by following the
Hall court's not-so-subtle directives.95 These two directives were to
follow the Minnesota model of statutory confidentiality protections and
to secure it by making it a crime to breach that confidentiality.6 The
Assistant Attorney General who argued on behalf of the State in Hall
noted:
The supreme court seldom offers us advisory opinions regarding
the constitutionality of prospective statutory language. I
recommend we take advantage of this opportunity. We should
seek amendment of sec. 139.91, Stats., to substitute the language
90. The State did not seek United States Supreme Court review of the decision in Hall
because they believed the state supreme court decision rested on adequate and independent
state grounds. See Steven Walters, Drug dealers may get refunds: After court ruling, one
dealer wants $17,000 back for tax stamps he bought, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 5, 1997,
at Al ("In its decision, the state Supreme Court relied entirely on Wisconsin law, which is
'not reviewable' by the U.S. Supreme Court, [Assistant Attorney General Matthew Frank]
wrote Revenue Department officials.").
91. See Letter from Steven Foti, Wisconsin State Assembly Majority Leader, to Jefren
Olsen, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (Apr. 21, 1997) (on microfiche with
Marquette University Law Library as part of the drafting record of 1997 Assembly Bill 512).
92. See Memorandum from Greg Posner-Weber, Assistant Attorney General, to
Matthew J. Frank and Sally L. Welman, Assistant Attorney Generals (Apr. 23, 1997) (on
microfiche with Marquette University Law Library as part of the drafting record of 1997
Assembly Bill 512) [hereinafter Department of Justice Memorandum].
93. See Memorandum of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, as attached to Letter
from Steven Foti, Wisconsin State Assembly Majority Leader, to Jefren Olsen, Wisconsin
Legislative Reference Bureau (Apr. 21, 1997) (on microfiche with Marquette University Law
Library as part of the drafting record of 1997 Assembly Bill 512).
94. See Letter from Matthew J. Frank, Assistant Attorney General, to Stewart
Simonson, Legal Counsel for the Governor's Office (Apr. 28, 1997) (on microfiche with
Marquette University Law Library as part of the drafting record of 1997 Assembly Bill 512).
95. See Department of Justice Memorandum, supra note 92.
96. See id.; State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778,788,791 (Wis. 1997).
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contained in the Minnesota confidentiality statute.
We should also seek amendment of section 139.91, Stats., to add
a criminal penalty for unlawful dissemination of facts obtained
by DOR personnel in the administration of the drug tax stamp
law. Similar provisions are contained in many state drug tax
stamp laws. Once again Hall is instructive ....
In essence what was adopted was a version of the Minnesota statute,
tailored somewhat to address the specific concerns of the Hall court.9
To address the problem of derivative use of information obtained by the
department in a drug prosecution where no tax has been paid, the
legislature simply eliminated the clauses of the confidentiality provision
that excepted this use.9' This alteration, along with the passage of a
provision providing that anyone in the DOR who reveals information
obtained through administering the tax is subject to a fine of up to $1000
and/or up to sixty days in jail," secured the confidentiality of any
information obtained by the DOR. However, the Hall court's concern
that the affix and display requirement compelled information was
focused not on information obtained by the DOR, but on information
obtained by law enforcement through their observation of the stamped
97. Department of Justice Memorandum, supra note 92.
98. The actual amendments to Subchapter IV came primarily through the 1997 State
Budget Act. See 1997 Wis. Acr 27 §§ 2979m - 2979q. However, as this act is voluminous,
the legislative history of the amendments may be more easily followed by tracking 1997
Assembly Bill 512, which carried solely the amendments as they appeared in the Budget Act.
See 1997 Wis. Ass. BILL 512. 1997 Assembly Bill 512 was tabled at the end of the legislative
session and never voted upon; however, all of its provisions were incorporated into the state
budget bill. See Wisconsin Assembly Journal, 93rd Sess., 786 (Apr. 2, 1998). The new
confidentiality provision reads:
(1) The department may not reveal facts obtained in administering this subchapter,
except that the department may publish statistics that do not reveal the identities of
dealers.
(2) The department may not require dealers to provide any identifying information
in connection with the purchase of stamps.
(3) No information obtained from a dealer as a result of the dealer's compliance
with this subchapter may be used against the dealer in any criminal proceeding
unless that information has been independently obtained, except in connection with
a proceeding involving taxes due under s. 139.88 from the dealer.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 139.91 (West Supp. 1999).
99. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 139.91(3) (West Supp. 1999).
100. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.95(4) (West Supp. 1999).
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drugs. To eliminate the possibility that the presence of stamps could be
used to infer knowledge of the substance, the legislature dropped the
language of "information obtained by the department" and replaced it
with a comprehensive ban in any criminal proceeding on the use on any
information derived from dealers or as a consequence of the dealer's
compliance with Subchapter IV.'1 As a result of these amendments, the
only situations in which information can be used are when information
conveyed by the dealer through his compliance is independently
obtained, and of course, when the presence or lack of stamps is used as
evidence of tax payment in a proceeding involving payment of that
tax. 
0 2
It seems that the legislature's attempt to draft a statute that is valid
in light of the Fifth Amendment privilege was successful. All of the Hall
court's concerns respecting compelled information were addressed
through the amended confidentiality provision's comprehensive
protection against derivative use of compelled information. This
conclusion requires no great gift of foresight however, given the
assistance that the Hall court gave the legislature in suggesting how to
remedy the constitutional defects of Subchapter IV, i.e., by suggesting
that the Minnesota confidentiality provision would have withstood
constitutional scrutiny" and by making such assertions as "if the
legislature had written the statute the way that the court of appeals
rewrote it, it would likely resolve the constitutional infirmities."'
Despite the speedy amendment of Subchapter IV, the decision in
Hall had widespread effects. First, the supreme court eliminated several
cases for which review had already been granted based solely on its
ruling in Hall.'O' A more dramatic impact of Hall is grounded in the
retroactivity of the decision, a point not discussed by the Hall court.
Several court of appeals decisions overturned convictions based on
101. See Wls. STAT. ANN. § 139.91(3); Memorandum from Jefren E. Olsen, Legislative
Reference Bureau (on microfiche with Marquette University Law Library as part of the
drafting record of 1997 Assembly Bill 512) [hereinafter Drafter's Note]. The drafters of the
statute deviated from the Minnesota statute and added the language above as a consequence
of a model confidentiality provision presented in Racaniello, supra note 1, at 677. See
Drafter's Note, supra. This work was also cited by the Hall court. See State v. Hall, 557
N.W.2d 778, 792 (Wis. 1997); Drafter's Note supra.
102. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 139.91(3).
103. See Hall, 557 N.W.2d at 791.
104. Id. at 792.
105. See State v. Hicks, 557 N.W.2d 412 (Wis. 1997) (deciding a case based on the same
challenge as presented in Halo; State v. Dowe, 557 N.W.2d 812 (Wis. 1997) (deciding that
Hall eliminated the need to reach a challenge based on double jeopardy grounds).
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Subchapter IV solely on the grounds of Hall; however their opinions did
not address the retroactivity of Hall specifically'0 In State v. Bentzel,"
the court of appeals reached the issue of retroactivity and concluded
that although a defendant may not have raised the issue in a timely
manner, the defendant will not be treated as waiving the challenge
because there are no factual issues to decide and because it is in "the
interests of justice" that Hall be applied retroactively.1" Thus, the courts
will reverse pre-Hall convictions based on violations of the
constitutionally defective version of Subchapter IV.
The reversal of convictions raises the related issue of refunds of
taxes and penalties paid under the pre-Hall version of Subchapter IV.
This issue was of particular concern to the legislators in their attempt to
revitalize Subchapter IV." The concern was prompted by actual
requests by dealers to recover taxes paid1 and possibly by media
accounts reporting the total amount of refunds to be around $200,000."'
Legislators toyed with the idea of providing drug dealers with a tax
credit for past payment under Subchapter IV,112 but at the request of the
Department of Justice the legislature passed a provision to retroactively
sever the civil obligation to pay the tax from the criminal punishments
for failure to pay, in an attempt to ensure that no refunds would be
106. See State v. Ruiz, 570 N.W.2d 556 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Martinez, 563
N.W.2d 922 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
107. 583 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
108. See id. at 436.
109. See Letter from Representative Steven Foti, Wisconsin State Assembly Majority
Leader, to Jefren Olsen, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (Aug. 20, 1997) (on
microfiche with Marquette University Law Library as part of the drafting record of 1997
Assembly Bill 512) ("I would like to ensure that drug dealers are simply not eligible for
refunds.").
110. See id
111. See Walters, supra note 90. This story ran on the front page of the Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel and contains the assertion by Wisconsin Revenue Secretary Cate Zeuske that
a two year statute of limitations on refunds would be applicable to refunds sought as a
consequence of Hall. See id In this article, the Revenue Secretary is also alleged to have
stated that the State has raised $920,000 from the sale of tax stamps, a figure not supported by
documentation released by the Department of Revenue. See id.; infra Part IV. It seems that
the total of requested refunds never reached the $200,000 level. By November 1997 the total
amount of requested refunds was only $17,600. See Fiscal Estimate Report prepared by the
Wisconsin Department of Revenue for 1997 Assembly Bill 512 (Nov. 20, 1997) (on microfiche
with Marquette University Law Library as part of the drafting record of 1997 Assembly Bill
512).
112. See Letter from Representative Steven Foti, Wisconsin State Assembly Majority
Leader, to Jefren Olsen, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (Aug. 20, 1997) (on
microfiche with Marquette University Law Library as part of the drafting record of 1997
Assembly Bill 512).
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available." This non-statutory provision was passed as part of the 1997
Budget Act."4 Its legal effect is unknown because no court has reviewed
its validity.
IV. THE REALITY OF THE DRUG TAX STAMP LAW AS A REVENUE-
RAISING MECHANISM
"The drug tax stamp law is a tax law. Yet the legislature never
expected this tax law to raise revenue."1" This statement of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Hall raises the question of whether
Subchapter IV, after being invalidated as a law enforcement tool in
Hall, can serve a revenue-raising purpose. The short answer is that it
clearly cannot.
When the Wisconsin legislature originally enacted Subchapter IV, it
made no clear predictions as to the amount of revenue to be raised by
the statute."6 The revenue raised under the Minnesota drug tax stamp
law was taken into account, but could not be used as an accurate
measure of what was to be expected in Wisconsin. Despite the
113. See Memorandum from Tom Creeron, Wisconsin Department of Justice, (July 11,
1997), as attached to Letter from Representative Steven Foti, Wisconsin State Assembly
Majority Leader, to Jefren Olsen, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (Aug. 20, 1997)
(on microfiche with Marquette University Law Library as part of the drafting record of 1997
Assembly Bill 512).
114. See 1997 WIS. ACM. 27 §9143(2v). The provision reads:
The legislature intends that, irrespective of the constitutionality of the affix and
display requirements under section 139.89 of the statutes and the rules that interpret
that section, all other civil and administrative procedures that are related to the civil
obligation to pay the tax, interest and penalties required under subchapter IV of
chapter 139 of the statutes are severable from those affix and display requirements
and are to remain in full force and effect. To the extent necessary to effectuate the
legislature's intent, the civil obligation to pay the tax, interest and penalties required
under subchapter IV of chapter 139 of the statutes is retroactively reimposed
beginning with the effective date under 1989 Wisconsin Act 122, section 3203(48)(a).
Id
115. State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778,790 (Wis. 1997).
116. See Fiscal Estimate Report prepared by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue for
1987 WIS. Ass. BILL 519, reproduced in Appendix to Brief of Defendant-Appellant-
Petitioner at 36, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR) [hereinafter
Fiscal Estimate] ("[It is not possible to accurately estimate the revenues which would result
from the proposed tax on controlled substances.").
117. See Summary of Provisions prepared by the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau for
1989 Wis. Acr 122 (Feb. 20,1990) (on file with the author). In the three year period between
1986 and 1989, Minnesota made assessments in the amount of $28 million, but was able to
collect only $780,000 of that amount. See id The dollar amount of assessments and
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inability to make numerical estimates, the view of many of those
evaluating the prospective revenue correctly predicted that it would be
negligible.' One fiscal estimate made the observation that the revenue
raised would be "very small" because
[in] many instances, the assets of persons charged with being
dealers of controlled substances are confiscated in the course of
prosecuting the persons. The criminal penalties generally
include substantial fines. Based on these actions, it is unlikely
that most of the persons subject to the controlled substances tax
will have the financial resources to pay the tax and penalties
due.1
9
Although one may only hypothesize as to the reasons why, it is clear
that the predictions of the drafters have borne true. Subchapter IV has
two means of raising revenue. First is the voluntary purchase of stamps
by dealers. Second is the imposition of tax assessments on dealers
following their arrest. Although both raise negligible revenue, the data
relating to the former clearly show that any notion of voluntary
compliance with the tax law is laughable'20 The Wisconsin DOR sells
five kinds of drug tax stamps. The state has never made a sale of two of
these. For another, the state has sold one stamp since the enactment
collections is far greater than any in Wisconsin for a given three year period. See infra notes
130-31 and accompanying text.
118. See State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778, 790-91 (Wis. 1997). The court noted:
The fiscal estimate of every draft of the drug tax bills exhibits a lack of revenue
producing purpose. 1989 Act 122 Fiscal Estimate ("[b]ased on the experience of
other states... revenues from sales of tax stamps would likely be minimal [and]
actual tax collections would generally amount to only a small portion of the total
assessments since collection of the controlled substances tax is difficult."); 1989 AB
633 Fiscal Estimate (estimating "minimal" sales revenues); 1989 SB 356 Fiscal
Estimate (anticipating minimal sales and minimal collection of penalties); 1989 SB
295 Fiscal Estimate (anticipating that this bill would have "no fiscal impact on state
or local government.") ....
Id. (alterations in original).
119. Fiscal Estimate, supra note 116.
120. For a comparison of the sale of stamps in Wisconsin to other states see Racaniello,
supra note 1, at 665-66 (noting that "the strength of these drug taxes to raise revenue is not
through stamp sales or pre-assessment compliance").
121. The stamps that have never been bought are those for LSD ($100.00 per 100
milligrams) and those for marijuana plants ($1000 per plant). The data relating to the sale of
tax stamps by the state were compiled by the author from records received from the Revenue
Stamp Accountant of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue. These records are on file with
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of the statute in 1989.1' The state has sold tax stamps for psychedelic
mushrooms on sixteen occasions, first beginning in 1993, for a total sale
of twenty-four stamps.2 By far the best-selling drug tax stamp has been
that for marijuana. Over the past ten years the state has sold 751
marijuana tax stamps for a total of $2628.50 in sales.124 The fact that this
stamp is the best selling is not surprising given that it is the least
expensive of the tax stamps at $3.50 per stamp (i.e., per gram of
marijuana). As is the experience in other states, it seems that that
majority of sales of these stamps may be to collectors or to the curious."'
The sales figures support this belief as the vast majority of sales are for
five stamps or fewer. These purchasers are not attempting to comply
with Subchapter IV because the tax is not applicable unless the taxpayer
has more than 42.5 grams of marijuana in his possession."' Thus, the
only purchasers who are trying to comply with the law are those who are
purchasing at least forty-three stamps or more. On only two occasions
since the law went into effect has there been a sale of at least forty-three
stamps, and one of those purchases was pursuant to a court order. 27
the author.
122. The stamps for which there was only one sale was for "other schedule I or II
substances" ($200.00 per gram).
123. These stamps sell at $10.00 per stamp. Thus, the purchase of tax stamps for
psychedelic mushrooms has raised $240.00.
124. The sale of marijuana tax stamps has by no means been consistent throughout the
past decade:
Stamps Sold Tax Collected
1990 232 $812
1991 76 266
1992 14 49
1993 288* 1008
1994 26 91
1995 19 66.50
1996 56 196
1997 20 70
1998 20 70
he sale of 237 of these stamps was pursuant to the order of a judge and therefore was not in
actuality voluntary compliance with the tax stamp law.
125. See Racaniello, supra note 1, at 665.
126. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 139.87(2) (West Supp. 1999).
127. See supra note 124. To be in compliance with Subchapter IV a dealer in possession
of psychedelic mushrooms would have to purchase at least fourteen stamps, because the tax is
not applicable unless there are fourteen or more grams in his possession. See WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 139.87(2). There has never been a sale of more than five tax stamps for mushrooms.
As far as dealers of "other schedule I or II controlled substances," the tax is not applicable
unless they have seven or more grams in their possession. Thus, as there has been only one
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Therefore, there has been only one individual in the history of
Subchapter IV who has voluntarily complied with the law.1 8 The low
dollar amount of the sale figures aside, the fact that in almost a decade it
is only possible for there to have been one situation of voluntary
compliance with the tax defeats the notion that the sale of tax stamps
serves any revenue raising purpose.
However, the sale of tax stamps is not the primary means by which
the State collects revenue under Subchapter IV. Rather, the tax is
collected primarily through imposition of the tax and penalties
subsequent to arrest for possession of the drugs."2 Even the revenue
raised through such assessments, however, fail to legitimize Subchapter
IV as a revenue raising mechanism. Generally the amount of
assessments tends to be large. For example, for the fiscal years of 1989-
90 through 1994-95 there was a total of $33,927,946.29 assessed against
dealers." Despite this large amount, only $1,003,521.30 was received or
seized."' This is a collection rate of approximately 2.96%. Excluding
fiscal year 1989-90 in which the law was in effect for only one month,
this averages out to be around $200,000 in revenue raised per year.
sale of one stamp of this category of stamps, and for there to be compliance the taxpayer must
purchase at least seven stamps, there has never been a case of voluntary compliance.
128. This lone individual, whose identity is shielded by the confidentiality provisions,
purchased fifty of the marijuana stamps on May 30, 1990. It is mere supposition that this sale
was to someone actually in possession of 42.5 grams or more of marijuana. It is a realistic
possibility that this individual was not trying to comply the law. If this is the case, there has
never been voluntary compliance with Subchapter IV.
129. See Racaniello, supra note 1, at 666 ("[I]t is overall non-compliance and the penalty
provisions that provide all of the revenue raised.").
130. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin
Foundation and Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, at 2 and App. 1, State
v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (94-2848-CR) (presenting chart received from
Department of Revenue giving annual breakdown of assessments from fiscal years 1989-90
through 1994-95). The total assessments for these years were levied against 649 dealers. See
id. This averages to approximately $52,277.00 per dealer.
131. See id. This amount does not include the $2,545.50 collected through stamp sales.
See id. The figure of approximately one million collected through 1995 is larger than that
presented in newspaper accounts in 1997. In May 1997, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
reported that the total amount collected under Subchapter IV was about $920,000. See
Walters, supra note 90. This report also alleged that the state had levied a total of $35.46
million in assessments, with a collection rate of around 2.6%. See id. If these numbers were
accurate, and assuming that they went only through the fiscal year 1995-96, the average
annual revenue raised is around $153,333. In October 1997 the Capital Times reported,
"Revenue Secretary Cate Zeuske said the law has not been a major source of tax revenue.
The state collected slightly more than $1 million in the eight years that the law has been on
the books." David Callender, Budget Revives Drug Tax Stamp Law, CAPITAL TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Oct. 1, 1997, at 4A.
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Prior to 1997 this amount was paid to the local law enforcement
agencies that made the arrest associated with the revenue. 32 The 1997
amendments to the statutory provision also contained an amendment to
the section dictating the appropriate uses of revenue.133 Now the DOR
may reduce from the total amount collected the costs of administering
Subchapter IV, which are estimated at $43,400.131 The net result is that
the state nets around $160,000 per year through the enforcement of
Subchapter IV.'3 Thus, although this figure is considerably more
substantial than the amounts raised through tax stamp sales, it is still
negligible. It could by no means be maintained that this statutory
scheme exists solely to raise this minimal amount of state revenue.
V. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECION AGAINST MULTIPLE
PUNISHMENTS AND SUBCHAPTER IV AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE
A. Background
As a practical matter, the Wisconsin scheme of taxing controlled
substances is limited in the extent to which it can be used as an
additional means to punish drug offenders. This is because the criminal
penalties for possession of the drug by a dealer without the appropriate
tax stamps may violate the double jeopardy provisions of both the state
and federal constitutions, 37 depending on the penalties and the
individual charging situations."
132. See WIs. STAT. § 139.96 (1995).
133. See 1997 Wis. Acr 27 §§ 2979p-q; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 139.96 (West Supp. 1999).
134. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.96 (West Supp. 1999).
135. See Fiscal Estimate Worksheet prepared by the Department of Revenue
accompanying 1997 Wis. Ass. BILL 512.
136. This figure corresponds roughly with the fiscal estimate of the DOR in drafting the
1997 amendments to Subchapter IV. At that time the DOR estimated that the annual net
revenue would be around $150,000. See id It should be noted that the figures presented
herein do not take into account the considerable sums likely expended by the State in
defending the numerous constitutional challenges that have been brought against convictions
under Subchapter IV's criminal penalties.
137. The Wisconsin Constitution's double jeopardy provision reads: "[N]o person for
the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment." WIS. CONST. art. I., § 8(1).
The United States Constitution's double jeopardy provision reads: "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend
V. Wisconsin's construction of its "prohibition against double jeopardy is guided by the
rulings of the United States Supreme Court." State v. Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d 712, 721 (Wis.
1994).
138. The defendants in both State v. Hall and State v. Dowe raised double jeopardy
arguments on appeal. In researching and writing this Comment, the author had access to the
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The Double Jeopardy provisions of both the United States and State
of Wisconsin constitutions provides three primary protections: (1)
protection "against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal," (2) protection "against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction," and (3) protection "against multiple
punishments for the same offense.' ' 39  These three protections have
developed two strains of double jeopardy law. The first two protections
lie behind the law of "successive prosecutions. '  The third protection
provides for the strain of double jeopardy law of "multiple
punishments.''.
1. The Fundamentals and Origins of the Wisconsin Multiple
Punishment Protection
In Wisconsin, the double jeopardy protection against "multiple
punishments for the same offense"'' is centered around the test
established by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v.
United States.Y3 Because the terminology attributed to this test in
Wisconsin has varied throughout the years, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in the 1992 case State v. Sauceda'" attempted to dispel any
confusion concerning the applicable test.'45 In Sauceda, the supreme
court laid out the two prong analysis that is required to determine
whether a combination of charges are violative of the state and federal
double jeopardy provisions,' 46 or using the terminology of the Wisconsin
courts, whether the charges are "multiplicitous."' 47 First, a court must
briefs of appellate counsel. In fact, the double jeopardy arguments made in these briefs led to
the analysis in this Comment. In State v. Dowe, appellate defense counsel on the brief was
Bryan J. Borman, Assistant State Public Defender. In State v. Hall, appellate defense counsel
on the brief was Robert R. Henak of Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
The author has borrowed from these sources with proper attribution and added to their
analyses throughout Part V.
139. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d at 717
(quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717).
140. See Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d at 717.
141. See id.
142 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.
143. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
144. 485 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1992).
145. See id. at 4 ("The lower courts.., seemed to be in confusion as to the applicable
double jeopardy test.") & n.8 ("Confusion regarding the applicable test for claims of
multiplicity has arisen because of the various labels applied to the tests used by this court to
determine whether the charging of particular offenses is multiplicitous.").
146. See id. at 4.
147. "Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in separate counts. Multiplicitous
[Vol. 83:659
WISCONSIN DRUG TAX STAMP LAW
apply the "elements only" test of Blockburger.1" If the statute passes
this test, explained below, then "[t]he statutes presumptively allow for
multiple punishments." ' The second prong of the multiple punishment
test is an analysis of legislative intent./" Charges may still be
"multiplicitous if the legislature intended that the multiple offenses,
[which pass the Blockburger elements-only analysis], be brought as a
single count." '
The first prong of the Wisconsin multiple punishment analysis, and
the focus of any inquiry into the multiple punishment strain of double
jeopardy protections, is the elements-only test of Blockburger.152 In
Blockburger, the United States Supreme Court established that if
prosecution is sought under two statutory provisions, they will constitute
the "same offense" and thus be in violation of the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment, unless "each provision requires
proof of [an additional fact] which the other does not."" 3 It is the use of
the word "fact" in Blockburger that has caused confusion among the
courts,'TM because at least in Wisconsin, to apply the test for multiple
charging is impermissible because it violates the double jeopardy provision of the Wisconsin
and United States Constitutions." State v. Tappa, 378 N.W.2d 883, 885 (Wis. 1985) (citations
omitted).
148. See Sauceda, 485 N.W.2d at 4.
149. Id. at5.
150. See id.
151. State v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 329,335 (Wis. 1998).
152. The "elements-only" test is also referred to as the Blockburger "same-elements"
test. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1992); State v. Vassos, 579 N.W.2d
35,40 (Wis. 1998).
153. 284 U.S. 299,304 (1932).
154. See Sauceda, 485 N.W.2d at 4 n.8. In attempting to address this confusion, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, as Justice Shirley Abrahamson correctly pointed out in dissent,
helped to further confusion. See id. at 8 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The court asserts that
the "additional fact" and "different fact" test are the same as the elements-only test. See id.
at 4 n.8. The court was trying to make this clarification because it had been misapplying these
labels in prior case law. See id. What the court failed to recognize in Sauceda is the existence
of tests for lesser included crimes applied in other jurisdictions, which unlike the elements-
only test, do look to see if there is an additional fact in the case which is necessary to prove
the allegedly included crime. See State v. Carrington, 397 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Wis. 1986)
("Commentators discern three approaches courts use to identify a lesser included offense: the
elements only approach (the strict statutory approach); the fact-element approach (the
pleadings approach; the cognate approach); and the fact approach."). "The elements only
test focuses on the statutes defining the offenses, not the facts of a given defendant's activity."
Id. In Carrington, the court stated, "We have declined to use either the fact-element or the
fact approach." Id. at 490. Although Carrington did not concern a double jeopardy claim,
but rather dealt only with the Wisconsin lesser included crime statute, Wisconsin Statutes
Section 939.66, and whether a defendant should have received an included offense jury
instruction, the court has said on many occasions that the Blockburger elements-only test is
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punishments one does not look to the individual facts of a case, rather
the comparison of the two charges relies solely on the statutory
elements of the crime charged.155 In general the test requires that if all
the elements of one crime for which conviction is sought are contained
within another crime for which conviction is sought, and as such there is
no extraneous element necessary to convict for the first (included)
crime, conviction on the included charge is illegal.1" In Wisconsin, this
elements-only test has been codified in Wisconsin Statutes section
939.66, the lesser included crime statute."" Thus, if a crime is a lesser
codified under section 939.66. See Sauceda, 485 N.W.2d at 4. Thus, although the double
jeopardy analysis and the section 939.66 analysis are derived from two different sources, a
constitutional protection against multiple punishments and a statutory limit on convictions,
the analysis of the first prong of the multiple punishments test and the lesser included crimes
analysis are identical. Therefore, Justice Abrahamson's dissent accurately portrays the
confusion surrounding the alternating use of labels by the court.
The continued confusion is a consequence of statements by the court which characterize
the test for multiple punishments as "whether each offense requires proof of an additional
element or fact which the other offense or offenses do not." Id. at n.8 (emphasis in original).
The court attempted to justify the use of such language by differentiating multiple
punishments under different statutory provisions following a single criminal act and multiple
punishments under a single statutory provision for multiple criminal acts. See id. Although
both raise multiple punishment issues, the court should cease using the term "additional
element or fact" in its statement of the law of cases involving multiple punishments under
different statutory provisions. Although the tests derive from the same protection, they are
analytically different. Both issues were raised in Blockburger, but the elements-only test
arose only in the discussion under part "Two" of that decision, which concerns a single act
being in violation of multiple statutes. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
The additional elements test concerns only situations where there are multiple punishments
under different statutory provisions. This is the Blockburger test. The statutes, however, also
perpetuate confusion in this area for they are modeled after the original language of
Blockburger. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 939.66(1) (1997) (defining an included crime as one
"which does not require proof of any fact in addition to those which must be proved for the
crime charged.") (emphasis added).
155. See Carrington, 397 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Wis. 1986) ("The paramount inquiry in the
elements only test is the meaning of the words of the statute. The elements only test requires
the court to place the statutes defining the greater and lesser offenses side by side... to
compare those elements.").
156. See id. at 486-87. One explanation of the elements-only test which has been
challenged is that in Randolph v. State, 266 N.W.2d 334 (Wis. 1978). The court stated therein:
"The rule consistently applied by this court is that, for one crime to be included in the
another, it must be 'utterly impossible' to commit the greater crime without committing the
lesser." Id. at 341; see also Craig Albee, Note, Multiple Punishment in Wisconsin and the
Wolske Decision: Is it Desirable to Permit Two Homicide Convictions for Causing a Single
Death?, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 553; William 0. Salen, Note, Critique of Wisconsin's Lesser
Included Offense Rule, Randolph v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 630, 266 N. W.2d 334 (1978), 1979 Wis.
L. REV. 896.
157. See State v. Sauceda, 485 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Wis. 1992). The statute reads, in pertinent
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included crime of another, the defendant has both a statutory protection
and the constitutional double jeopardy protection against conviction for
both.
There is only one situation in which Wisconsin courts have
acknowledged that they will delve further than the plain statutory
language to determine if two crimes fail the elements-only analysis, and
that is when one of the crimes provides for alternating elements." In
such a case, if a crime may be proved by one of a choice of elements, for
purposes of an elements-only analysis, the court will treat the offense as
"two or more crimes, each crime being defined as containing one of the
alternative elements.""1 9 In order to determine which of the alternative
crimes to apply the Blockburger test, the court must look to the charging
instrument' 60 to see which of the elements was actually charged.""
939.66 Conviction of included crime permitted. Upon prosecution for a crime, the
actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included crime, but not
both. An included crime may be any of the following:
(1) A crime which does not require proof of any fact in addition to those which must
be proved for the crime charged.
WIs. STAT. § 939.66 (1995) (emphasis added).
The statute goes on to list other crimes which would fall under the Blockburger test embodied
in subsection (1), but which are deemed by the legislature to be lesser included crimes. See
WIS. STAT. §939.66 (2)-(7). Another Wisconsin statute that encompasses the Blockburger
test is section 939.71. This statute concerns only successive prosecutions and reads:
939.71 Limitation on the number of convictions. If an act forms the basis for a
crime punishable under more than one statutory provision of this state or under a
statutory provision of this state and the laws of another jurisdiction, a conviction or
acquittal on the merits under one provision bars a subsequent prosecution under the
other provision unless each provision requires proof of afactfor conviction which the
other does not require.
WIS. STAT. §939.71 (emphasis added).
For a recent discussion by the Wisconsin Supreme Court of the interplay between these two
statutes and the respective double jeopardy interests which they serve see State v. Vassos, 579
N.W.2d 35 (Wis. 1998).
158. See State v. Carrington, 397 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Wis. 1986). Carrington was
concerned with explaining the lesser included crimes doctrine under 939.66 and the focus of
which is on attacks on the selection of charges issued by the prosecutor and not attacks on
multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds. However, because the pertinent test is the
same under section 936.66 and under the multiple punishments analysis, the explanation of
the test in Carrington would seem to be applicable to a multiple punishment case.
159. Id.
160. The view to the charging instrument may be applicable in an attack on multiplicity
in charging based on the statutory protection provided by section 939.66; however, if one was
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The focus on legislative intent as a second element of the multiple
punishments analysis arose in Missouri v. Hunter.2 The United States
Supreme Court in Hunter held that regardless of the outcome of the
Blockburger test, legislative intent controlled the multiple punishment
question.9 Thus, as in Hunter itself, if a charging scenario failed
Blockburger, i.e., one charge was an included crime of the other, the
defendant could be convicted on both counts if it was clear that the
legislature intended to allow it."' The Hunter Court stated:
[S]imply because two criminal statutes may be construed to
proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test does not
mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition,
in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those
statutes ....
Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes
cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether
those two statutes proscribe the "same" conduct under
Blockburger, a court's task of statutory construction is at an end
and the prosecution may seek and the trial court or jury may
impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single
trial."
It is the existence of Wisconsin Statutes section 939.66' that alters
the application of the Hunter legislative intent inquiry in Wisconsin. In
State v. Gordon,"7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed legislative
attacking on double jeopardy grounds following conviction, the view should more properly be
to which of the alternative elements were relied on at trial by the prosecution to prove the
crime. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 72, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis.
1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
161. The Carrington court relied for its explanation on a footnote in the case of
Hagenkord v. State, 302 N.W.2d 421 (Wis. 1981). See Carrington, 397 N.W.2d at 489. In this
footnote the court explained that because the crime of first degree sexual assault could be
proved by one of two alternating elements, namely causing great bodily harm or by causing
pregnancy of the victim, to determine which element is charged one must look to the
accusatory pleading. See id.; Hagenkord, 302 N.W.2d at 437 n.8. Appellate counsel in State v.
Hall, developed a similar explanation of the case involving alternating elements in his brief.
See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 70-72, State v. Hall, 507 N.W.2d 778 (Wis.
1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
162. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
163. See id. at 368-69.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 157.
167. 330 N.W.2d 564 (Wis. 1983).
[Vol. 83:659
WISCONSIN DRUG TAX STAMP LAW
intent to determine whether multiple punishments for felony murder
and kidnapping, which failed Blockburger, because kidnapping is a
lesser included crime of felony murder, was authorized by the
legislature."6 The court found that separate statutory sections for each
crime would not suffice as "'clear' legislative intent to allow two
convictions and two sentences where the same criminal conduct violates
both statutes."'69  The court was particularly convinced that the
legislature did not intend multiple punishments by the embodiment of
the Blockburger test in Wisconsin Statutes sections 939.66 and 939.71.'70
These statutes served as "clear and express statements of the
legislature's intent to prohibit multiple punishments of included
crimes."' 7' Thus, in light of the existence of these two statutes and in the
absence of a clear statement of the legislature that multiple punishments
are allowed, there was no need to continue with the second prong of the
analysis,"n given that the charging situation failed Blockburger.'"
168. See id. at 566-70.
169. ld. at 567.
170. See id.; supra note 157.
171. Gordon, 330 N.W.2d at 569.
172- See id. at 570.
173. Following Gordon, there was confusion among the courts as to the role legislative
intent was to play. In State v. Bohacheff, two charges passed Blockburger, yet the court found
that despite the fact that the charges were not for the "same offense" the legislature did not
intend to allow conviction for both. 338 N.W.2d 466, 473 (Wis. 1983). In State v. Tappa, the
court stated, "Even though the charging of multiple counts is not violative of double
jeopardy, it may still be multiplicitous if the legislative intent shows that the allowable unit of
prosecution is one count." 378 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Wis. 1985). However, in two court of
appeals cases which followed, the courts terminated their analysis after the offenses were
found not to be the "same offense" under Blockburger. See State v. Nelson, 432 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ambuehl, 425 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). It
appears that it was the state supreme court's decision in State v. Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d 531 (Wis.
1991), that authoritatively established the role of legislative intent as it was presented in
Sauceda and subsequent cases such as State v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 329, 335 (Wis. 1998). In
Kuntz, the court acknowledged that because section 939.66(1) codifies Blockburger, that
Blockburger is the "established rule of statutory construction in Wisconsin for determining
whether the legislature has authorized multiple punishments." Kuntz, 467 N.W.2d at 544.
The court cited to Gordon for this proposition, suggesting that it had always been the case
that if a charging scenario failed Blockburger and, as such, the two charges were for the
"same offense," that the legislative intent question would always be decided in favor of
disallowance of conviction for both. See id. The court went on to recite the role of legislative
intent in situations where the Blockburger test was satisfied. In such a case, as applied in
Bohacheff and as stated first in Tappa and later in Sauceda, legislative intent to disallow
multiple punishment would trump the outcome of the Blockburger analysis. See id. at 544-45.
Thus, despite the court of appeals' admitted confusion in the post-Kuntz case of State v.
Grayson, 478 N.W.2d 390,393 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), the Kuntz court had established how
the Hunter analysis is currently applied in the context of the section 939.66(1). For a
misstatement of the law by a court in 1995, see infra note 269.
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However, if a given combination of convictions passes the
Blockburger analysis, that is neither crime is an included crime of the
other, it has cleared the hurdle of the first prong of the multiple
punishments test and that of the lesser included crime statute, but it may
still be susceptible to attack under the legislative intent analysis. For
constitutional purposes, at this point, the conviction for both is
presumptively valid." This presumption of validity may be rebutted if
there is a "clear indication" of a contrary legislative intent,175 that is, that
the legislature intended to disallow multiple punishments for the two
crimes.'76 Therefore, in Wisconsin, as a consequence of section 939.66,
legislative intent may trump the Blockburger analysis only in the
situation in which the convictions do not involve the conviction of both a
greater and lesser included crime.
2. The Interplay Between Successive Prosecution and Multiple
Punishment Jurisprudence
Developments in the law of successive prosecutions at the United
States Supreme Court level have also played a role in shaping the law of
multiple punishments in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
although recognizing that the two strains of double jeopardy law exist to
"protect[] different interests," has determined that these different
interests do not "necessarily require or even recommend separate
analyses."'7 This oversimplifies the issue somewhat, by implying that
the tests are identical. The Blockburger test is the cornerstone for
analysis under both the successive prosecution and multiple punishment
protections,' 78 but the tests are not identical. The multiple punishment
analysis, as explained above, requires an inquiry into legislative intent
patterned after Missouri v. Hunter, which is not engaged in under a
successive prosecution analysis.'79 Despite the differences between the
174. See State v. Sauceda, 485 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Wis. 1992).
175. See id.; State v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 329,335 (Wis. 1998).
176. Legislative intent may be determined in the multiple punishments context by
looking to several factors, namely statutory language, legislative history, "the nature of the
proscribed conduct," and "the appropriateness of multiple punishment." Anderson, 580
N.W.2d at 335.
177. State v. Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d 712,721-22 (Wis. 1994).
178. See id.
179. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 724 (1993) (White, J., concurring in part)
(explaining that a legislative intent analysis is improper in successive prosecution cases given
the interests that the protection is meant to serve); Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d at 722 (reaching the
conclusion that double jeopardy in a successive prosecution case was not violated solely on
the grounds that "the two offenses each require proof of an element the other does not" and
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two tests, for the purposes of this discussion, it is relevant that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that the Blockburger analysis
conducted under each test is the same."s
The unification of the law in the two areas was a consequence of the
1993 United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Dixon."'
This case is relevant to this discussion for two reasons. First, it allowed
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to reach the conclusion that at least part
of the analysis under multiple punishment and successive prosecution
law is identical, and thus it allows successive prosecution precedent to be
used in arguing multiple punishment cases. Second, the analyses of the
Court in the various opinions of the case provide new insight into the
Blockburger elements-only test.
In Dixon, two respondents were both convicted of criminal contempt
of court for violating court orders, and both challenged subsequent
prosecution for the conduct that led to the contempt convictions on
double jeopardy grounds.ln Alvin Dixon was released on bond while
awaiting trial for homicide."' A condition of his release was that he not
commit "'any criminal offense,"' and the penalty for a violation of this
condition was a prosecution for contempt."" Dixon was found to have
violated this condition by being in possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute."s  The trial court convicted Dixon of criminal contempt,
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in possession with intent
to distribute."
thus "survive[s] Blockburger analysis."). In addition to the legislative intent protection
required in a multiple punishment case, the defendant in a successive prosecution case, in
which the defendant faces charges following conviction or acquittal that do not offend
Blockburger, has the additional protection of the collateral estoppel doctrine that is
incorporated into the double jeopardy protection. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
This protection prevents the state from "relitigat[ing] factual issues that have already been
adjudicated to the defendant's benefit in an earlier prosecution." Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d at
721.
180. See Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d at 722.
181. 509 U.S. 688 (1993). The author was lead to an analysis of the drug tax stamp law
charging situation using United States v. Dixon by the arguments presented in the defendant's
briefs in State v. Hall and State v. Dowe. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 21-
23, State v. Dowe, 557 N.W.2d 812 (Wis. 1997) (No. 95-0314-CR); Brief for Defendant-
Appellant-Petitioner at 65-70, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
This Comment, however, explores Dixon in greater depth and provides a slightly altered
analysis in this context.
182. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 691.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 691-92.
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The second respondent, Michael Foster, was subject to the
conditions of a civil protection sought by his wife on the grounds of
alleged spousal abuse.1" The order required that Foster, subject to
penalty of a criminal contempt conviction, not "'molest, assault, or in
any manner threaten or physically abuse"' his wife." Foster's wife
subsequently sought to have Foster held in contempt based on three
threats and two assaults."s The trial court convicted Foster on four
counts of contempt, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Foster had
threatened his wifeag° and had twice assaulted her, as defined by the
statute for criminal assault."'
In addition to their respective contempt convictions, the prosecution
also sought substantive criminal convictions against Dixon and Foster
based on the underlying conduct." Dixon faced indictment on a charge
of cocaine with intent to distribute1 9 Foster faced charges of simple
assault, three counts of threatening to injure another, and one count of
assault with intent to kill."9
Faced with this factual situation, the Court was left with two
questions to consider. First, does the Fifth Amendment double
jeop4rdy protection mandate that "prosecution for criminal contempt
based on violation of a criminal law incorporated into a court order bars
a subsequent prosecution for the criminal offense?" '95  And in so
answering the first, the Court addressed the second question of which
test to apply in a successive prosecution double jeopardy case. In its
resolution of these issues the Court was heavily divided. The case
produced five opinions. Justice Scalia, announcing the Court's
judgment, carried a majority for only three of the five portions of his
opinion. '9 In addition there were partial concurrences and partial
187. See id. at 692.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. Foster was acquitted on some of the charges alleging his violation of the court order
based on threats to his wife. See id. at 693. This is relevant only in the sense that his later
attacks on the indictments against him would be based on both the protections against
successive prosecutions after acquittal and after conviction.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 691, 693.
193. See id. at 691.
194. See id. at 693.
195. Id. at 695.
196. See id. at 691. Of the parts of Justice Scalia's opinion, only Part I (statement of the
facts and case history), Part II (review of the law of criminal contempt), and Part IV
(abrogation of the "same-conduct" test of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)) are the
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dissents by Chief Justice Rehnquist,"9 Justices White,'" Blackmun, 99 and
Souter.' Ultimately the judgment of the Court was that the charges of
possession with intent to deliver against Dixon and the charge of simple
assault against Foster were violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause."'
A majority of the Court also held that the 1990 case of Grady v.
Corbin was overruled, thus eliminating the "same-conduct" test for
successive prosecution analysis.'
Certainly the most significant effect of Dixon on double jeopardy
jurisprudence is its overruling of Grady. In 1990, Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, widened the scope of double jeopardy protection
in successive prosecution cases by holding that "the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted."'  Arguing in dissent against the
establishment of this "same-conduct" rule, Justice Scalia stated his belief
that the Blockburger test alone was not only sufficient, but was the
"'established test' for determining whether successive prosecutions
arising out of the same events are the 'same offense."' In Dixon,
opinion of the Court. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 691. Only Justice Kennedy joined Justice
Scalia's opinion as to Part III (application of the Blockburger to the facts of the case). See id.
197. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas. See Dixon,
509 U.S. at 713 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part). These three Justices dissent to the
judgment reached in Part IIIA of Justice Scalia's opinion (the finding of double jeopardy
violations through the application of Blockburger), but joined in the overruling of Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), in part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 713-
14 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part).
198. Justice White was joined by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice Souter for Part I
of the opinion (the concurrence in the judgment as to Part HIA of Justice Scalia's opinion).
See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 720 (White, J., concurring in part). Together they agreed with thejudgment as to Part IIIA of Justice Scalia's, but dissented to the judgment as to Part IIIB of
Justice Scalia's opinion (the finding that the charges of threatening to injure another and
assault with intent to kill against Foster were not in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause)
and to Part IV. See id.
199. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment as to Part IIIB of Justice Scalia's
opinion, but dissented to the judgment as to Parts IIIA and Part IV. See id. at 741-42
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
200. Justice Souter was joined by Justice Stevens. See id. at 743. They dissented to the
judgment as to Part HI B of Scalia's opinion and to Part IV, but concurred in the judgment as
to Part IIIA. See id. at 743-44 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
201. See id. at 712.
202. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
203. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 691,704.
204. Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.
205. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2000]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Justice Scalia now writing for the Court on this issue, held that because
Grady lacked "constitutional roots" and was generally "inconsistent"
with precedent, it was overruled."°
In the place of Grady's same-conduct standard, it is clear that a
majority of the Dixon court felt that at a minimum Blockburger
remained in its place.w It is the application of the Blockburger test to
the cases of Dixon and Foster in the various opinions that will shed light
on the state of multiple punishment analysis in Wisconsin. Although
essentially four positions were established in Dixon as to the outcome of
Dixon's and Foster's cases, relevant to this discussion are the positions
of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist,m as they both agree that
Blockburger is the sole test to be applied.'
Justice Scalia put forth an analysis that will be referred to as an
"incorporation" analysis. Under this analysis, Blockburger is the sole
test to be applied, and in reviewing the elements of non-summary
criminal contempt one must look to the conditions actually imposed by
the judge issuing the violated court order.210 If the conditions imposed
reference another crime, all of the elements of that crime are
"incorporated" into the elements of criminal contempt.1 Thus, in the
case of Dixon, where the condition imposed by the judge was that Dixon
206. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704. While the overruling of Grady is the key holding of Dixon,
as this Comment is concerned with the multiple punishment strain of double jeopardy
analysis and, in particular, the effects of Dixon on the Blockburger analysis, this aspect of the
holding is intentionally given short shrift.
207. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 66, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
208. The other two positions were that of Justices Souter, Stevens, and White and that of
Justice Blackmun. The group of three Justices in their three opinions all objected to the
overruling of Grady and stated that although Blockburger is an applicable test, it is not the
exclusive test. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 735 (White, J., concurring in part), 749 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part). In their minds, Blockburger provides insufficient protection against the
special interests meant to be served by the protection against successive prosecutions and is
better suited to multiple punishment analysis. See id. at 724 (White, J., concurring in part).
Although the opinions maintaining this position sometimes shed light on the application of
Blockburger, they will be addressed only briefly because these Justices were not working
solely within the framework of Blockburger, as were Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Thus, the outcome of their analysis is irrelevant for the purposes of this
Comment. Justice Blackmun's position was that criminal contempt is a special situation
protecting a separate judicial interest than the substantive criminal law, and therefore does
not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 741-42 (Blackmun, J. concurring in
part). His opinion sheds no light on the applicable standard of analysis after Grady, much
less on Blockburger, and is irrelevant for present purposes.
209. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part).
210. See id. at 697-98.
211. See id. at 698.
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not commit any criminal offense, the elements of any statute defining
any crime were made elements of criminal contempt.212 The barred
subsequent prosecution could have just as easily been for arson or
armed robbery, for example, as it was for possession with intent to
distribute, so long as the act prosecuted in the subsequent prosecution
was the grounds for finding a violation of the release order.
In the case of Foster, who was subject to a court order providing that
he not "'molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or abuse"' his
spouse, Justice Scalia found that the condition barring assault carried
with it the elements of criminal assault as defined by the District of
Columbia statutes!' Therefore, "the subsequent prosecution for assault
fail[ed] the Blockburger test, and [was] barred." '214 However, the other
counts against Foster were not barred under Blockburger.25 The three
counts of the indictment for alleged threats passed Blockburger because
the court order merely stated that Foster not "'in any manner threaten'
his wife, but the statute under which he was indicted required that the
threats be "to kidnap... or to injure the person of another or physically
damage... property. '21 6 Because of the broad array of non-criminal
threats that could be made in violation of the court order, Justice Scalia
found it "highly artificial" to find that the court order incorporated any
criminal law proscribing a form of threatening.2 7 Thus, on a purely
elemental analysis, the criminal threatening charges contained
numerous other elements beyond the mere threatening that would have
sufficed to violate the court order.2 8 Furthermore, the assault with
intent to kill could not be included within the "assault" portion of the
court order because of the extra-element of the substantive crime
requiring a "specific intent to kill.
219
In support of his incorporation analysis, Justice Scalia pointed to
Harris v. Oklahomam a three paragraph per curiam opinion." In
212. See id
213. See id. at 700.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 702.
217. See id. at n.8.
218. See id. at 702.
219. See id. at 701. Justice Scalia also pointed out how criminal contempt could not be
an included crime of either the statute defining threatening or the statute defining assault
with intent to kill because of the existence of the additional element or requiring proof of
knowledge on the part of the defendant of the court order. See id. at 701-03.
220. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
221. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 698.
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Harris v. Oklahoma, a defendant was first convicted of felony-murder, a
crime requiring proof of an underlying felony, which in this case was
armed robbery.m He was later brought up on charges of armed
robbery.2m The court stated simply, "When, as here, conviction of a
greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser
crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one."'' 4
Although the Harris v. Oklahoma Court did not cite to Blockburger,
Justice Scalia construed the fact that the existence of one crime rested
on the existence of a predicate crime to support his theory of elemental
incorporation.' That is, just as the elements of armed robbery were
incorporated into felony-murder, so should the elements of crimes
included in a court order be incorporated into the crime of criminal
contempt for violation of that order.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion shows that it is on this reading of
Harris v. Oklahoma that his and Justice Scalia's views as to elemental
incorporation diverge. The Chief Justice will follow Justice Scalia only
halfway to conclude that Harris did stand for some elemental
incorporation, but not to the degree applied by Justice Scalia in Dixon
itself . 6 He likens Justice Scalia's approach to an absolute departure
from Blockburger because it looks to "the facts that must be proved
under the particular indictment at issue - an indictment being the closest
analogue to the court orders in [Dixon]. ' 't Justice Scalia's flaw lies in
his departure from the statute and view to the court order.2M Harris v.
Oklahoma, Chief Justice Rehnquist contends, stands for elemental
incorporation only to the extent that there is in one statute a "generic
reference which by definition incorporates the statutory elements of"
another, as was the case in Harris v. Oklahoma.29 Thus, because the
statute defining criminal contempt did not reference any of the criminal
provisions under which Foster and Dixon were indicted, there was no
double jeopardy violation.'
In addition to the statutory "generic reference" which is required,
222. See Harris, 433 U.S. at 682.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 698.
226. See id. at 717 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part).
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. See id.
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the Chief Justice laid out two additional requirements necessary for a
violation of Blockburger. First, the two crimes must be "akin to greater
and lesser included offenses. '23' He rejects the "counterintuitive" notion
that a serious felony, such as Dixon's possession charge, could be "a
lesser included offense of criminal contempt, a relatively petty offense
as applied to the conduct in this case. ' ' 32 Also, Chief Justice Rehnquist
would require that a lesser included offense be one that is "'necessarily
included' within the statutory elements of another offense."'' 3 This
means that one necessarily satisfies the element of the greater crime by
committing the lesser.' In the case of a criminal contempt, because the
statute does not make assault, for example, a predicate act, one may
commit assault and not necessarily satisfy the statutory elements.25
In sum, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of incorporation by reference
is a more narrow construction of Blockburger than Justice Scalia's
incorporation analysis. It seems that were a case presented that could
be decided on those more narrow grounds, the Chief Justice would
garner Justice Scalia's support, and a majority of the Courte would be
satisfied that at least the Chief Justice's incorporation by reference
would be applicable.'
Following the decision in Dixon, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
State v. Kurzawa,m adopted the "analysis of Dixon" in successive
prosecution cases." Given the lack of analytical consistency among the
various Dixon opinions, what this statement means is unclear. It is clear
that Blockburger was adopted in lieu of Grady.2 It is also made clear
that some form of incorporation analysis was understood to come along
with the adoption of Dixon. However, the court was not faced with a
231. See id at 718 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See iL
235. See iU.
236. The Chief Justice carried the support of Justices O'Connor and Thomas with his
opinion in Dixon. Together with Justices Scalia and Kennedy, these five compose a majority
of the current Supreme Court.
237. Interestingly, Justice White, who is no longer on the Court appears to have stated
that were he of the belief that Blockburger was the sole applicable test, he would have been
inclined to adopt the Scalia approach. See id. at 734 n.8 (White, J., concurring in part) ("At
the very least, where conviction of the crime of contempt cannot be had without conviction of
a statutory crime forbidden by court order, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for
the latter after acquittal or conviction of the former.").
238. 509 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1994).
239. See id at 722.
240. See id-
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situation in which it had to choose explicitly between Chief Justice
Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's approaches. The Kurzawa court was
faced with a claim that two charges were of the "'incorporation' species
of lesser included offenses." 24' In addressing this claim the court pointed
to Chief Justice Rehnquist's "necessarily included" analysis, but it did
not discuss the application of elemental incorporation in Dixon, but
rather focused on the incorporation through "statutory definition" in
Harris v. Oklahoma.42 It is only in a footnote that Justice Scalia's
application of Blockburger was addressed.2 '3 Thus, although neither
approach of Dixon was explicitly adopted or rejected, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court seems to have accepted that at a minimum Chief Justice
Rehnquist's interpretation of Harris v. Oklahoma is applicable in
Wisconsin.
Despite the fact that the supreme court was not explicit in its choice
of incorporation analysis, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has found in
a case analogous to the facts of Dixon, State v. Harris,244 that Kurzawa is
to be construed as rejecting Justice Scalia's approach.245 In finding that a
conviction of bailjumping, where the predicate offense was cocaine
possession, together with conviction for the cocaine possession was not
violative of double jeopardy's multiple punishment protection, the court
stated that Kurzawa "implicitly reject[ed] the incorporation analysis
discussed in [Justice Scalia's opinion] by reference to 'statutory
elements."'' ' Whether the Kurzawa court intended to address the issue
of the applicability of Justice Scalia's approach is debatable, but the
State v. Harris court clearly misconstrued Kurzawa in making another
assertion, namely that Dixon is distinguishable on the grounds that it
was a successive prosecution case, while the case at hand was a multiple
punishment case. 47 The Kurzawa court explicitly rejected any such
distinction and unified the analysis under both strains of double
241. Id. at 721-22.
242. See id. at 722.
243. See id. at n.16. The defendant in State v. Hall urged the Wisconsin Supreme Court
to ignore Harris as "poorly reasoned." See Brief for Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 74,
State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
244. 528 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
245. See id. at 9.
246. Id.
247. See id. Another questionable use of precedent by the State v. Harris court was the
use of the pre-Dixon Wisconsin Court of Appeals case of State v. Nelson, 432 N.W.2d 115
(Wis. Ct. App. 1988), which held that bail jumping and its predicate crime are separate
offenses. See Harris, 528 N.W.2d at 8. Although Scalia's Dixon opinion is not binding, given
the court's questionable reading of Kurzawa, the court's reliance on Nelson is dubious.
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jeopardy m If one disregards the court of appeals' faulty attempt to
differentiate the analysis under the two strains, State v. Harris, in light of
the statements in Kurzawa, still leaves the impression that at least Chief
Justice Rehnquist's incorporation by generic reference analysis under
Blockburger would be applicable in Wisconsin under either strain of
double jeopardy analysis.
B. The Post-Dixon Multiple Punishment Protection and Subchapter IV.
The criminal penalties for violation of Subchapter IV serve an
ancillary role in state prosecutions of drug offenders and are not used
with great frequency 9 This is likely a result of the fact that the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act ("Chapter 961") provides an array
of penalties that are sufficient, severe, and with which prosecutors are
comfortable. Another possible reason is that, as recent history has
shown, Subchapter IV is a ripe ground for constitutional issues on
appeal. The issues raised here do not involve facial challenges to the
statute, but show how the manner in which the statute has been drafted
forecloses the use of the Subchapter IV's criminal penalties in many
situations and present constitutional questions concerning individual
charging situations.
In discussing the use of Subchapter IV as a punitive measure in light
of the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments, it is
necessary to develop several scenarios involving different combinations
of convictions. These situations, some of which have been presented to
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, are based on combinations of
convictions of the three primary penalty provisions under Chapter 961
with the primary criminal penalty under Subchapter IV, section
139.95(2). The primary provisions under Chapter 961 are convictions
for (1) possession of controlled substances,' (2) possession with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or deliver controlled substances,"' and (3)
248. See Kurzawa, 509 N.W.2d at 721-22 ("[W]e recognize that the Double Jeopardy
Clause's prohibition against 'successive prosecutions' protects different interests than does its
prohibition against 'multiple punishments.' Still, we do not believe that these different
interests necessarily require or even recommend separate analyses."); supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
249. In 1998 in Milwaukee County, the most populous and urban county in the state, the
District Attorney's office brought only 36 charges under Subchapter IV. In the same year
there were 1,999 felony drug cases in the county. Thus, less than 2% of the charges brought
were for violations of Subchapter IV. This information was obtained through a telephone
interview with Pat Kenney, Assistant District Attorney for Milwaukee County, Wisconsin.
250. See Wis. STAT. § 961.41(3g) (1997).
251. See WIs. STAT. § 961.41(lm) (1997).
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manufacture, distribution, or delivery of controlled substances z 2 By
applying the Wisconsin multiple punishment test to the convictions
under each of these in combination with a violation of Subchapter IV, it
is clear that the combination involving possession charges are violative
of double jeopardy, and that the combination with possession with
intent may be as well. The consequence of this is that the limited
viability of Subchapter IV as a punitive measure is even more
hampered.
1. Simple Possession Cases
Under the first scenario, a defendant is convicted under Wisconsin
Statutes section 961.41(3g) for possession of a schedule I or II narcotic
as a first offense and under section 139.95(2) for being a dealer in
possession of the drug without evidence of payment of the tax. The
defendant is subject to up to one year in jail for the possession
conviction' and up to five years for the Subchapter IV violation.4
Such a defendant has a strong argument that his conviction for both of
these offenses violates the double jeopardy protection against multiple
punishments for the same offense.
Following the analysis under Sauceda, one must first break down the
statutory elements of the two crimes in order to apply Blockburger. For
the conviction of the possession charge, the state must prove that the
defendant possessed a controlled substance which is a narcotic. 5 To
prove the violation of Subchapter IV, the prosecution must prove the
following: (1) that the defendant is a dealer, (2) that he possessed a
schedule I or II controlled substance, and (3) that the drugs did not bear
evidence of payment of the tax.
Applying Blockburger, because the second element of Subchapter
IV is the same as that required for a conviction under Chapter 961, a
defendant who violates Subchapter IV necessarily violates Chapter
961.6 Thus, the possession charge is a lesser included crime of the
252. See WIs. STAT. § 961.41(1) (1997).
253. See Wis. STAT. § 961.41(3g)(a). The statute provides for a felony sentence of up to
two years upon conviction for the defendant's second offense. See id
254. See WIS. STAT. § 139.95(2) (1997).
255. This analysis works on the assumption that Wisconsin courts would construed the
requirements as to quantity to be more in the nature of a penalty enhancer. Cf State v.
Thompson, 431 N.W.2d 716 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that proof of the monetary amount
of damage in a criminal damage to property case is not an element of the crime for
multiplicity purposes).
256. The criminal penalty under Subchapter IV actually contains the element of
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stamp tax violation, and punishment for both fails Blockburger. As
explained above the legislative intent analysis, because of section 939.66,
is also completed, and as such, the conviction for both is violative of
double jeopardy.
The defendant in this situation is benefited only marginally by this
result however. First, when a defendant is convicted in such a manner,
the remedy is that the lesser included conviction is vacated.57 Thus, the
defendant is left with the conviction for the felony drug tax stamp
violation that carries the greater sentence. Although the prosecutor
may avoid this result through his discretion not to charge the drug tax
violation if they deem the case worthy of only the misdemeanor
treatment, another consideration suggests that the prosecutor may seek
the felony conviction. Because the definition of dealer requires that the
defendant have in his possession certain quantities (e.g., 42.5 grams of
marijuana) before the statute is applicable to him, the amount of drugs
that such a defendant would have to have in his possession would be
substantial. Thus, it would seem that the prosecutor would likely seek a
charge of possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or deliver,
which carries a larger penalty. This intent may be shown by a variety of
factors, including quantity53 If for some reason, however, there was not
a solid case against the defendant for possession with intent, the larger
sentence under the drug tax stamp violation would be a viable
alternative.
2. Cases Involving Possession with Intent
In the second situation a defendant is convicted of possession with
intent to deliver, manufacture, or distribute?' and the criminal violation
of the drug tax stamp law. The penalties for possession with intent vary
possession twice. The definition of "dealer" provides that one may possess the set quantity of
drugs as a means of achieving that status. See WIS. STAT. § 139.87(2) (1997). Although there
are others, if the substantive drug charge is for simple possession it is likely that the state
would not be able to show, for example, that the defendant shipped or manufactured the
drugs. If the prosecutor could show such, the substantive drug charge would likely be under a
statute penalizing such conduct rather than under the possession statute. Thus, the defendant
would in effect be convicted three times under the charging situation of being in possession of
the narcotics under the above charging situation.
257. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 76-77, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR) (citing State v. Gordon, 330 N.W.2d 564,570 (Wis. 1983)).
25& See WIS. STAT. § 961.41(lm) (1997).
259. See id. For the purposes of this argument it is not necessary to denote which
specific intent is actually being charged. In actuality, however, these three specific intents
comprise three different crimes.
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greatly based upon the quantity and the drug possessed. Therefore,
taking marijuana as an example, because the defendant would have had
to possess at least 42.5 grams for Subchapter IV to be applicable, the
corresponding penalty for possession with intent of that amount is a
three-year felony.2  Although this sentence is lighter than that for
violation of the tax stamp law, the penalty for possession of a different
drug with intent could greatly exceed that for the Subchapter IV
violation."
Unlike with simple possession, the elemental breakdown under
these statutes requires that the dealer element of the drug tax violation
be broken down in order to reveal the potential multiple punishment
problem. 2 The dealer element may be satisfied by one of ten
alternative forms of conduct.' A "'[d]ealer' means a person who in
violation of ch. 961 possesses, manufactures, ships, transports, delivers,
distributes, imports, sells, or transfers to another" the requisite amount
of drugs.2 ' For the purposes of someone charged with possession with
intent to deliver, it will be assumed that the element that could be
satisfied is that of possession in violation of Chapter 961. This is based
on the assumption that, if the dealer could satisfy any other provision of
this definition, they would have been brought up on charges of
manufacturing, delivery or distribution of controlled substances which
carry a more severe penalty. Given this assumption, the elemental
breakdown of the tax stamp violation would be as follows: (1) the
defendant possessed the controlled substance in violation of Chapter
961, (2) the defendant possessed the statutory minimum of under
section 139.87(2) (e.g., 42.5 grams of marijuana), (3) the defendant
possessed a schedule I or II controlled substance, and (4) the controlled
substance did not bear evidence of payment of the tax.' 6s The two
elements of the possession with intent charge are that the defendant
possessed the controlled substance and that he had the intent to deliver,
260. See Wis. STAT. § 961.41(1m)(h)(1) (1997).
261. For example, the tax is not applicable unless one has seven or more grams of
heroin. See WIS. STAT. § 139.87(2) (1997). The maximum penalty for possession of seven
grams of heroin with intent is 15 years. See WIs. STAT. § 961.41(lm)(d)(2). In almost all
cases, the potential fine for possession with intent is far greater than that under the drug tax
violation. Compare Wis. STAT. § 941.41(1m)(h)(1) (1997) with WIs. STAT. § 139.95(2)
(1997).
262 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 16, State v. Dowe, 541 N.W.2d 218
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 95-0314-CR).
263. See WIS. STAT. § 139.87(2) (1997).
264. Id.
265. See Defendant's Brief at 16, Dowe (No. 95-0314-CR).
[Vol. 83:659
WISCONSIN DRUG TAX STAMP LAW
distribute, or manufacture.
At first this seems like a case where Blockburger is passed, that is
neither crime is included in the other as there is the added element of
intent to deliver, distribute or manufacture in the substantive drug crime
charge. This is how the court of appeals construed this combination of
charges in State v. Dowe.2 In Dowe, the defendant was charged with
possession with intent to deliver marijuana and the tax stamp violation,
and sought an interlocutory appeal subsequent to the trial court's denial
of a motion to dismiss the possession with intent charge on the grounds
that it was a lesser included offense of the tax stamp violation.f 7
Although the information did not specify how the dealer element was
satisfied,m the court of appeals apparently assumed that it was on the
grounds of possession, as they held that the possession under the
definition of dealer did not include possession with intent, given the
additional element of intent to deliver. 9
However, the Dowe court failed to recognize the implications of the
fact that the definition of dealer requires possession in violation of
Chapter 961. In light of the conclusions drawn above regarding U.S. v.
Dixon,"° it seems that this is a case calling for incorporation by generic
reference under Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis."' In this situation
the qualifier that the possession be in violation of Chapter 961 would
seem to incorporate all forms of criminal drug possession into the
definition of dealer.m Because possession of drugs with intent to deliver
is possession in violation of Chapter 961, all of the elements of the
possession with intent are replicated in the elements of the drug stamp
266. 541 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 557 N.W.2d 812
(Wis. 1997). The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted a petition for review but did not rule on
the double jeopardy issue as a consequence of the decision in State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(1997). See State v. Dowe, 557 N.W.2d 812 (Wis. 1997).
267. See Dowe, 541 N.W.2d at 220.
268. See Defendant's Brief at App. at 112, Dowe, (No. 95-0314-CR).
269. See Dowe, 541 N.W.2d at 220. Interestingly, the court did not engage in an inquiry
into legislative intent. In explaining why they need not reach the issue, the court showed how
it did not understand the implications of Missouri v. Hunter and State v. Sauceda. The court
stated, "Since we have concluded that the offenses are different, we do not discuss whether
the legislature nonetheless did not intend to allow multiple prosecutions or punishments." Id.
at 220 n.2. This is an incorrect application of the two part multiple punishment analysis. See
supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
270. 509 U.S. 688 (1993); see supra notes 207-37 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text; Defendant's Brief at App. at 17,
Dowe, (No. 95-0314-CR).
272. See Defendant's Brief at App. at 112, Dowe, (No. 95-0314-CR).
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violation.273 Once this incorporation is acknowledged, one cannot
"abstract" the intent element from the possession to reach the
conclusion that the two crimes are separate.274
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, also laid out two qualifications to
his approval of incorporation by generic reference of the kind in Harris
v. Oklahoma.5 First, he required the crimes be "akin to greater and
lesser included offenses."' 6 In Dowe and like situations there is no
disparity between the seriousness of the offenses comparable to that
present in Dixon.2n Both offenses are felonies, and as under the facts of
Dowe, in many situations the Chapter 961 violation will actually be a
lesser crime, that is one with a lighter penalty278 Also the Chief Justice
required that commission of the lesser crime necessarily satisfy the
elements of the greater crime.279 In this case, a defendant who commits
possession with intent to deliver has necessarily committed possession in
violation of Chapter 961.
There are several other arguments to be made that, while not falling
into the framework of Blockburger, suggest that the definition of dealer
should be construed as incorporating all forms of criminal possession.
First, an "incongruous result" occurs if a possession with intent is not a
lesser included offense of the drug tax stamp statute, but other drug
crimes (e.g., simple possession and possibly delivery, manufacture and
distribution)m are lesser included offenses. 8' Second is the fact that the
legislature included the word "possesses" in the language of section
139.87(2) in order to make the provision applicable to those "drug
dealers . . . arrested for possession with intent to sell or deliver."'
Finally, the common-sense meaning of "dealer" would sooner include
those possessing with intent to deliver, manufacture, or distribute before
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. 433 U.S. 682 (1977); see Dixon, 509 U.S. at 717-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part); supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
276. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part); supra notes 231-32 and
accompanying text.
277. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part).
278. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
279. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part).
280. See infra Part III.B.3.
281. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 25-28, State v. Dowe, 557 N.W.2d
812 (1997) (No. 95-0314-CR).
282. Id. at 27-28, App. 146 (quoting Motion to Amend Spec. Sess. Wisconsin Assembly
Bill 12, excerpted from the Legislative Reference Bureau's drafting file for 1989 Wis. Act
122).
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it would include those simply in possession.' The effect of not giving
the term its common-sense meaning is that those who possess the
statutory minimum for personal use will be subject to the criminal
penalties of Subchapter IV, while an actual drug trafficker in possession
of less than the statutory minimum will not, despite the fact that he is a
"dealer" as the term is commonly understood.'
A legitimate counter-argument to the proposition that the tax stamp
law includes possession with intent is that, given Justice Scalia's careful
parsing of the words of Michael Foster's court order in Dixons he
would equally parse the words listing the elements that satisfy the dealer
element.' Just as the word "assault" in Foster's court order standing
alone could not be interpreted to mean assault with intent to kill,
likewise the word "possesses" could not be interpreted to mean
possesses with intent to deliver.m Also, the implication that the
reference to Chapter 961 incorporates all forms of criminal possession is
problematic given that one who "ships" or "imports" controlled
substances in violation of Chapter 961 may be a dealer, despite the fact
that neither of these terms are used in Chapter 961. Although they may
be forms of delivery or distribution, to construe them as included in
delivery would be to flout the elements-only test.
Whether a court will accept the above arguments and find possession
with intent to be included within the definition of a dealer is subject only
to speculation. It is a legitimate construction of the statute, but the
Wisconsin courts have never applied an incorporation analysis like that
presented in Dixon, despite the adoption of the analysis of Dixon. As
illustrated by Dowe, the Wisconsin courts tend not to stray from
technical readings of statutory language, in which they do not look
beneath the surface of the words when conducting Blockburger
analyses. However, if such an analysis were adopted, by logical
implication, all forms of possession under Chapter 961, including the
forms of possession signified by proximity to certain places, such as
schools, would also be included.m
283. See Amicus Brief of Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 5-6,
State v. Dowe, 557 N.W.2d 812 (1997) (No. 95-0314-CR).
284. See id. at ll.
285. See U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,700-01 (1993).
286. See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 14-15, State v. Dowe, 557 N.W.2d 812 (1997)
(No. 95-0314-CR).
287. See id; Dixon, 509 U.S. at 701.
288. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 961.49 (1997) (prohibiting "[d]istribution of or possession
with intent to deliver a controlled substance on or near certain places").
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3. Cases Involving Manufacture, Distribution, or Delivery
In the third possible combination of convictions, a defendant is
convicted under Chapter 961 for the manufacture, delivery, or
distribution of a controlled substance' and for violation of the drug tax
stamp law. In general, regardless of the type or amount of drug for
which the Chapter 961 violation is for, the maximum sentence will
greatly exceed that for the drug tax violation.290 Therefore, it is
important to note at the outset that from the prosecutor's perspective
the delivery charge will invariably be the preferred charge.
With this combination of convictions a defendant is likely to have
the least success in arguing that the convictions violate the multiple
punishment protection. The facts of State v. Hall29 present the problems
with any such argument. Before having his conviction overturned on
the grounds of the violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, Darryl
Hall had argued unsuccessfully to the court of appeals that his
combination of convictions for both delivery of cocaine base and the
drug tax penalty violated double jeopardy. 2 The delivery of cocaine
base, Hall argued, was included within the tax stamp violation, because
his dealer status was established by proving that he delivered seven or
more grams of a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 9 61..9 The
court of appeals, in brief fashion, held that double jeopardy was not
violated because a dealer "includes an individual who possesses seven
grams or more of a ... controlled substance." 2w4 Because the tax stamp
violation did not require proof of delivery, while the Chapter 961
violation did, the combination passed Blockburger.29 The court's
opinion leaves much to be desired, but it is justifiable through some
interpretation. One interpretation is that the court was suggesting that
because other elements hypothetically could satisfy the dealer element,
there was no double jeopardy violation.'9 This is contrary to the
289. See Wis. STAT. § 961.41(1). Each of these three is a separate crime for which the
charging instrument would identify only one per charge and for which a jury at trial would be
instructed as to only one. See Wis. JI - Criminal 6020 (delivery), 6021 (manufacture).
290. The only exception to this is for delivery, manufacture or distribution of marijuana,
for which there must be at least 500 grams involved before the maximum sentence reaches the
level of five years. See WIS. STAT. § 961.41(1)(h)(2) (1997).
291. 540 N.W.2d 219 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997).
292. See id. at 228.
293. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 72, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
294. Hall, 540 N.W.2d at 228 (emphasis added).
295. See id.
296. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 62-63, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
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understanding of the elements only test in any case where any of a
number of forms of conduct may fulfill the requirements of a crime.'
However, the court may have been implying that because the drug tax
stamp violation requires proof of possession as an element external to
the definition of dealer,2" proof of this, which was given at trial, would
satisfy the alternative element of possession under the definition of
dealer. This would foreclose the argument that the dealer element was
necessarily established by showing that Hall had delivered the drugs.
On appeal, Hall argued that just as one looks to the charging
document in deciding which crime was charged under a statute with
alternating elements, the court must look to which element was actually
relied upon at trial to satisfy the dealer requirement!" The difficulty
with this argument is that there was no evidence that the State specified
which of the alternative forms of conduct was meant to satisfy the dealer
element. At trial, although it is unclear from the record, the jury likely
received a pattern instruction in which the jury is told simply that any
one of the elements will satisfy the dealer element." Because both
possession and delivery were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it
would have to be shown that the jury satisfied the dealer requirement on
grounds of delivery.
Even if the Wisconsin Supreme Court had reached the issue and
made the unlikely determination that the ambiguity as to which ground
satisfied the dealer element required reversal, unlike with the charging
combinations above, prosecutors could easily circumvent this problem.
This is because in any case involving delivery the prosecution should be
able to prove easily that the defendant was in possession of the drugs at
some point in time. In fact, to prove a violation of section 139.95(2), the
(Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR). In the information the defendant was charged as being a
"dealer in possession" and the state interpreted this to mean that the underlying basis of his
dealer status was his possession and not his delivery. See Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 27,
State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778 (Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR).
297. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 63-65, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR). Hall correctly points out that if his premise (Le., that the court
of appeals was suggesting that the existence of a hypothetical alternative means of satisfying
the statute would suffice) were true, this would contradict the decisions in Harris v.
Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), and State v. Gordon, 330 N.W.2d 564 (Wis. 1983). See id. In
both of these cases, if his premise were true, the courts could have found that the underlying
felony in a felony-murder conviction was not included because the felony-murder could have
been proved by any number of hypothetical predicate felonies. See id.
298. See WIS. STAT. § 139.95(2) (1997).
299. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 70-72, State v. Hall, 557 N.W.2d 778
(Wis. 1997) (No. 94-2848-CR); supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
300. See Wis. JI - Criminal 6009.
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prosecution must prove this."1 Thus, a prosecutor need only draft a
charging instrument making it clear that the dealer element rests upon
possession and request a jury instruction that instructs the jury to find
the dealer requirement satisfied only on the grounds of possession. It is
merely the duplication of the element of possession in the criminal
penalty of Subchapter IV that allows this result.
In summary, the manner in which Subchapter IV was drafted
precludes the use of the criminal penalty in combination with simple
possession, and possibly with possession with intent. These problems
may only be remedied by altering the statutory language. It is also the
awkward nature of the statutory language which allows the State to use
the Subchapter IV as an additional punitive measure in a case involving
delivery, manufacture, or distribution. Although the drug tax criminal
penalty is not used with great frequency, its own language limits its
applicability, even in many situations in which it was intended to be
used, i.e., situations involving the taxable quantity of controlled
substances.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin drug tax stamp law was born out of desires to satisfy
an illegitimate purpose. After judicial intervention prevented the State
from using the law to serve this purpose, the law was left to find some
purpose for its existence. The law cannot be seen to serve any
legitimate revenue-raising purpose, and although it serves some function
as an additional punitive measure in the war on drugs, the manner in
which the statute was drafted makes it ripe for challenge. At the time of
its passage it was innovative and en vogue, but in its short life, the law
has proved to be a failure and a waste of legislative and judicial
resources.
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